When Intellectual Capital Drives the Business Model, then ... by Nielsen, Christian
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
When Intellectual Capital Drives the Business Model, then ...
Nielsen, Christian
Published in:
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011
Publication date:
2011
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Nielsen, C. (2011). When Intellectual Capital Drives the Business Model, then ... In M. Reddy, & A. Lloyd (Eds.),
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 (3 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 26-31). Hubcap-digital.
http://www.hubcapdigital.com/
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 
Volume 1, Number 3, Sept 2011 
Made available under Creative Commons licence  
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 
Published by  Human  Potential Accounting  on  
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 
Conceived by 
Dr Michael Reddy 
 
 
Author Community Host 
Stuart Shaw 
 
 
Editor 
Anna Lloyd 
 
 
Designer  
Natalia Reddy 
 
The Human Capital Handbook 2011 
Volume 1, Number 3 
Published September 2011 
ISBN Number: 978-0-9567311-3-5 
 
Made available by                , Milton Keynes, UK, under 
Creative Commons Licence, Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 
humancapitalhandbook.com 
 
alpha.hubcapdigital.com 
editor@hubcapdigital.com 
 
hpa-group.com/blog 
 
@hubcapdigital 
 
linkedin.com/company/hubcap-digital 
2 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
From the Director 
 
Creating Authentizotic Organizations  
Manfred Kets de Vries 
 
Case Study: ROI on Diversity Management at ISS Denmark   
Morten Kamp Andersen 
 
Chasing Stars: The Myth of Talent and the Portability of Performance  
Boris Groysberg 
 
Human Capital Management 
Michael Reddy 
 
When Intellectual Capital Drives the Business Model, then .... 
Christian Nielsen 
 
Sell-Side Research: Three Modest Reform Proposals 
Michael Mainelli, Jamie Stevenson and Raj Thamotheram 
 
Book Review: Good Company 
Anna Lloyd 
 
The Publishers 
Don’t read this alone. 
It’s dynamite. Read it out loud, read it with colleagues. 
 
Don’t read it before falling asleep. 
It will keep you awake. 
 
Don’t start on page one. 
Hop to the end, skip to the middle, jump from one 
article to others that intrigue. 
 
Don’t keep it to yourself. 
Email it to everyone you know, including your boss, 
unless you are the boss. In which case, don’t keep it 
to yourself. Tell everyone in the office. 
 
Don’t keep quiet. 
Challenge the authors if you don’t agree with them. 
 
Don’t think this is it. 
It’s not. This is a living document. It’s designed to 
grow, and to include your voice too.   
editor@hubcapdigital.com 
 
Lastly, human capital isn’t an abstract. It’s the 
people in your business. 
If you know your people, you know your business.  
And so do they. 
CONTENTS TIPS 
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From the Director 
Summer is officially over. The weather has turned. Rain on an almost continual basis. And 
as the comedian Peter Kay quipped, it’s “that fine rain that soaks you through.”  Perfect 
weather then to sit back before the first real log fire of the year and browse the latest 
issue of the Human Capital Handbook.  
 
So what autumnal treats do we have in store?  
 
We have an international cast. And we cover a lot of ground in this issue. Debunking 
talent myths – which always makes for an enjoyable way to pass the time. Proving links 
between diversity and the bottom line – welcome now more than ever. Tracing the causes 
of the current financial crisis to its unexpected source – a link guaranteed to confront 
everyone. All served up with a heart-warming intellectual capital cocktail.  
 
As Camus said – on one of his better days - ‘Autumn is a second spring where every leaf 
is a flower’.  We hope you find a little sunshine on every leaf here.  
 
Michael Reddy, Ph.D., AFBPsS, FRSA 
Director, Human Potential Accounting 
FROM THE DIRECTOR 
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CREATING AUTHENTIZOTIC ORGANIZATIONS: 
WELL-FUNCTIONING INDIVIDUALS IN VIBRANT 
COMPANIES1 
 
Manfred Kets de Vries 
The Best Companies to Work For 
 
Once a year since 1983, Fortune magazine has come out with a 
“most admired American companies list” list. The editors of Fortune 
poll something like eleven thousand people before compiling their 
lists: primarily senior executives, outside directors, and investment 
analysts. The criteria for inclusion on these lists are factors such as 
quality of management, quality of products and services, innovation, 
long-term investment value, wise use of corporate assets, financial 
soundness, and responsibility to the community and the 
environment. To be high on the list of most admired companies is a 
great tribute, to be sure; however, admiration does not answer the 
question, Are these organizations the healthiest places to work? 
 
Fortune made an effort to answer that question by publishing a Best 
Companies to Work For  list. Corporate characteristics such as 
inspirational leadership, excellent facilities (including those that rank 
as perks), and a sense of purpose were key traits in those 
organizations that obtained a prominent position on this list.  
According to the information given, employees in the winning 
organizations had a great trust in management, tremendous pride in 
their work and company, and a sense of camaraderie.  
 
 
 
5 
says: 
Do you love your work? Do you believe in the brand? Do you feel that what you do matters? Does the work mean as much to you as family 
and hobbies? Does it make you smile, or smile through gritted teeth? Are you a cog, or a lynchpin? Few thinkers can lay claim to have led 
the leadership debate. Few thinkers we know have nailed the psychological contract. Few thinkers have anchored their leadership insights 
on deep insights into human nature and what we really want from work. Now, more than ever, few thinkers are more needed. 
These perceptions arose in part because these companies 
subscribed to practices such as stock option plans, profit sharing 
systems, no-layoff policies, non-hierarchical structures, information 
sharing systems, flexible hours, and casual dress codes. A 
considerable number of events held in these companies – events 
such as Friday evening beer bashes, parties to celebrate company 
milestones, and company picnics – helped in creating a sense of 
community. Being pioneers in innovative perks also added to this 
positive picture – perks such as state-of-the-art fitness centres, 
leisure facilities, on-site clinics, on-site childcare, creative family-
oriented extras, great cafeterias with great food, and generous 
health insurance policies. In short, the companies high on this list 
went to great lengths to create humane corporate cultures that 
would positively affect mental health. 
 
But what are the psychological dimensions that make these 
companies great places to work? How do they tap their human 
potential? 
1 A longer version of this paper was published in       
Human Relations, 54(1), 101-111  
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associated with the breaking of the psychological contract are 
high: as the identification process has weakened, the work 
situation has become more stressful. This development does 
not augur well for the mental health of employees. Despite the 
gloomy outlook, however, organizational leadership can take 
positive steps to make their companies healthier places to 
work. 
 
The  Individual 
 
The search for what it is that makes organizations vibrant – 
makes them great places to work – begins with an 
understanding of the well-functioning individual. To gain that 
understanding, we must ask, Under what conditions does a 
person feel most alive? Responding to this question is easier 
said than done, however. Definitions of what makes for a 
“healthy” individual seem to vary depending on the person 
making the observations. 
 
When psychotherapists are asked what makes for a well-
functioning person, they generally say that “healthy” people are 
those who operate at full capacity. These therapists see their 
role as encouraging patients to gain insights into their goals 
and motivations, helping them better understand their strengths 
and weaknesses, and preventing them from engaging in self-
destructive activities. The emphasis is on widening people’s 
area of choice, thereby enabling them to choose freely rather 
than be led by forces outside of their awareness. 
The Containment Role of Organizations 
 
In the context of providing a stabilizing influence, organizations 
have always been important orientation points in a sea of 
change. With life in organizations more turbulent now than 
ever, the companies listed on the “best to work for” hit parade 
are more the exception than the rule. In most organizations in 
this era of business re-engineering and excessive 
preoccupation with shareholder value, the “psychological 
contract” – the commitment to reward organizational loyalty 
with long term employment – has been broken. With loyalty 
and organizational identity shrinking in importance, the 
employee has become an independent agent, displacing the 
“organization man” of yesteryear – that person with great 
emotional attachment to his or her company 
 
In the past, being associated with a company was an effective 
way to affirm one’s role in the world. Making a commitment of 
loyalty to the company helped an employee integrate his or her 
self-experiences; in other words, it contributed in establishing a 
sense of identity. Affiliation with an organization also helped 
employees cope with economic and social upheaval, because 
organizations (whether consciously or unconsciously) played 
the role of “holding environment,” containing anxiety through 
the agency of senior management (and thereby contributing a 
measure of stability); that too was part of the psychological 
contract.  
 
Yet now, in this age of overwhelming discontinuity, employees 
must do without that traditional pillar of stability. The costs  
6 CREATING AUTHENTIZOTIC ORGANIZATIONS |  MANFRED KETS DE VRIES 
WHAT ARE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 
THAT MAKE THE „BEST COMPANIES TO WORK 
FOR‟ GREAT PLACES TO WORK? HOW DO THEY 
TAP THEIR HUMAN POTENTIAL? 
 
“ 
” 
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Although this answer has a lot of merit, it needs some elaboration. From my experience in working with large numbers of executives, I have concluded that 
healthier people possess a common set of characteristics. (I say healthier rather than healthy because health and illness are dimensions on a continuum.) 
The most salient of these characteristics are described below: 
 
 Healthier people possess a stable sense of identity; that is, 
they have a good sense of who they are. 
 
 They have a great capacity for reality testing. 
 
 They resort to mature defence mechanisms and take 
responsibility for their actions, refusing to blame others for 
setbacks. 
 
 They experience the full 
range of affects; they do 
not  suffer from alexithymia 
or colour-blindness with 
respect to their feelings.  
They live intensely and are 
passionate about what 
they do. 
 
 They know how to manage 
anxiety, and they do not 
easily lose control or resort 
to impulsive acts. 
 
 They have the capacity to 
establish and cultivate 
relationships, they actively 
maintain a support 
network, and they know 
how to use help and 
advice. 
 They know how to handle 
ambivalence and can see 
people in a balanced 
manner. 
 
 They are creative and 
possess a sense of 
playfulness and thus have 
the capacity to non-conform. 
 
 They have a positive outlook 
toward the world and can 
therefore reframe 
experiences in a positive 
way. 
 
 They have the capacity for 
self-observation and self- 
analysis and are highly 
motivated to spend time on 
self-reflection. 
 They have a sense of belonging and connectedness, viewing 
themselves as part of a larger group; they obtain a great sense 
of satisfaction about the social context in which they are living. 
 
 They know how to deal with issues of dependency and 
separation. 
 They have a strong sense of self-efficacy, believing 
in their own ability to control the events that affect 
their lives. 
 
 They are mentally strong enough to deal with the 
setbacks and disappointments that are an 
inevitable part of the trajectory of life. 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
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specific forms of behavior – values such as trust, fun, candour, 
empowerment, respect for the individual, fairness, teamwork, 
entrepreneurship/innovation, customer orientation, accountability, 
continuous learning, and openness to change. Although these 
values, and the practices associated with them, go a long way 
toward explaining the success of many of Fortune’s vibrant 
organizations, they alone cannot bring about exceptional 
performance. Four additional conditions are necessary for getting 
the best out of people. 
 
1. As part of the needs-addressing process, leaders of exemplary 
organizations must create a sense of purpose for their people. 
Senior executives must create and articulate a vision of an ideal 
future state – a vision fleshed out with vivid description of the 
organization’s fundamental purpose and culture, its values and 
beliefs. This description of the organization’s future – if imbued with 
sufficient meaning – will have connecting value and thus contribute 
to a group identity. This step addresses workers’ 
attachment/affiliation motivational need system. 
 
2. To address workers’ exploration/assertion motivational need 
system, organizational leadership must create conditions that foster 
a sense of competence. This goal is reached when organizational 
participants have a feeling of ongoing personal growth and 
development. To prevent stagnation, continuous learning is 
essential. On-the-job growth and development offer a strategy for 
reaffirming the self and preserving personal equilibrium. When the 
exploration/assertion motivational need system is blocked, 
frustration increases and creative actions dissipate. 
 
3. In addition, organizational leadership needs to create a greater 
sense of self-determination among employees. For the sake of 
organizational mental health, it is essential that employees have a 
feeling of control over their lives. Conditions should be created 
whereby employees see themselves not as mere peons in the larger 
scheme of things but as capable masters of their own lives. 
 
 Search for Meaning 
 
Work holds an important place in humankind’s search for 
meaning. Because meaningful activity at work can contribute to a 
sense of significance and orientation, work offers a way to 
transcend personal concerns. In addition, it helps to create a 
sense of continuity. Leaving a legacy through work is an 
affirmation of one’s sense of self and identity and thus serves as 
an important form of narcissistic gratification. 
 
Given the importance of basic human motivational needs, 
organizational leadership has the responsibility to institute 
collective systems of meaning – a responsibility that is greater 
than ever in these times of discontinuity. The challenge these 
leaders face is to recognize humankind’s search for meaning and 
create circumstances that allow people to do tasks in the 
workplace that are experienced as consequential. Subjective 
experiences and actions need to be made meaningful. This 
challenge requires that work be done in ways that make sense to 
the employees, leading to congruence between personal and 
collective objectives. Facilitating congruence between the inner 
and outer worlds of employees will contribute to individual and 
organizational health. 
 
Searching for Congruence 
 
So how can ways to meet the motivational needs that underlie 
humankind’s search for meaning be integrated into organizational 
life? What can organizational leaders do to make workers’ 
existence in their organizations more meaningful? In this age of 
discontinuity, what can be done to minimize the negative side 
effects of work? What can be done to imbue employees with the 
kind of meaning that helps them to feel fulfilled? 
 
An answer to this conundrum can be found if we once more look 
at Fortune’s list of “best companies to work for”. An in-depth 
content analysis of these companies reveals that they are 
steeped in a number of values that are then also translated into   
8 
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4. Simultaneously, leadership must create a sense of impact 
among the employees. In other words, each organizational 
member must be convinced that his or her actions make a 
difference, affecting organizational performance. Believing that 
each member of the organization has a voice is what 
empowerment is all about. 
 
Paying Attention to Meta-values 
 
Even these four necessary conditions that help to get the best 
out of people are not sufficient conditions to create captivating 
workplaces, however. The best companies possess a set of 
meta-values that closely echo the earlier described motivational 
systems and create among their people a sense of belonging (a 
feeling of community that comes from being part of the 
organization, addressing once more the attachment/affiliation 
need), a sense of enjoyment in what they are doing (a feeling that 
comes from addressing the exploration/assertion need), and a 
sense of meaning about the activities they are engaged in. 
 
A Sense of Belonging. Because attachment/affiliation is a 
powerful underlying motive in humankind’s search for meaning, 
the first important meta-value contributing to the creation of 
healthy organizations is “love.” Seeing love as a corporate value 
implies creating a sense of belonging, a feeling of community, 
which then bears the fruit of trust and mutual respect. A sense of 
community, with the concomitant preparedness to help others, 
goes a long way toward creating goal-directedness and a 
cohesive culture. It also contributes to the emergence of 
“distributed leadership” – that is, leadership spread out 
throughout the organization rather than concentrated at the top. It 
is fostered in organizations whose senior executives obtain 
vicarious pleasure in coaching their younger executives and feel 
proud of their accomplishments. This sense of generativity is a 
source of creativity and contributes to feelings of continuity (as 
one’s efforts continue through the work of successors).  
9 
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Healthier places to work 
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A Sense of Enjoyment. Furthermore, in highly effective 
companies employees seem to enjoy themselves. Having fun – the 
ability to be playful – is an important dimension of both 
organizational and mental health. In too many companies, 
however, this sense of enjoyment is completely ignored (or worse, 
deliberately stifled), resulting in a lack of imagination and 
innovation. Executives in exemplary organizations are fully alive – 
and contagiously so: they realize that taking people on an exciting 
journey while encouraging them to have fun gratifies another 
essential motivational need, humankind’s need for 
exploration/assertion. 
 
A Sense of Meaning. If these basic motivational need systems are 
addressed in the context of transcending one’s own personal 
needs – that is, if tasks are presented as improving the quality of 
life, helping others, or contributing something to society – the 
impact on workers can be extremely powerful. People like to work 
in organizations that recognize the importance of providing a sense 
of meaning. It is such organizations that are able to get the best out 
of their people. In organizations that provide meaning, people put 
their imagination and creativity to work. 
The Authentizotic Organization 
 
Organizations that meet the human needs discussed above – 
organizations that will set the standard in the twenty-first century 
– are what can be described as authentizotic. This term is derived 
from two Greek words: authentikos and zootikos. The first 
conveys the idea that the organization is authentic. In its broadest 
sense, the word authentic describes something that conforms to 
fact and is therefore worthy of trust and reliance. As a workplace 
label, authenticity implies that the organization has a compelling 
connective quality for its employees in its vision, mission, culture, 
and structure. This means that the organization’s leader has 
communicated clearly and convincingly not only the how but also 
the why of every job, revealing meaning in each person’s tasks. 
 
The term zootikos means “vital to life.” In the organizational 
context, it describes the way in which people are invigorated by 
their work. People in  organizations to which the zootikos label  
can be applied feel a sense of balance and completeness. In 
such organizations, the human need for exploration, closely 
associated with cognition and learning, is met. The zootikos 
element of this type of organization allows for self assertion in the 
workplace and produces a sense of effectiveness and 
competency, of autonomy, initiative, creativity, entrepreneurship, 
and industry. 
 
It may seem utopian but in the twenty-first century, organizational 
leaders are challenged to create corporations that possess some 
of these authentizotic qualities. Working in authentizotic 
organizations will reduce organizational stress, provide a healthier 
existence, increase the imagination, and contribute to a more 
fulfilling life. Because authentizotic organizations help their 
employees maintain an effective balance between personal and 
organizational life, these are the organizations we need to hope 
and strive for.  
WORKING IN AUTHENTIZOTIC 
ORGANIZATIONS WILL REDUCE 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS, PROVIDE A 
HEALTHIER EXISTENCE, INCREASE THE 
IMAGINATION, AND CONTRIBUTE TO A 
MORE FULFILLING LIFE.  
“ 
” 
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CASE STUDY: ROI ON DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT 
MANAGEMENT AT ISS DENMARK  
 
Morten Kamp Andersen 
What tangible benefits and financial value does a Diversity 
Management program add? How can this be measured and 
how is it proven? These were some of the questions ISS 
Denmark asked as it embarked on a journey to prove that its 
multi-year effort on creating a diverse workforce had created 
Shareholder Value. 
 
Measuring the value of HR is a cornerstone of Human Capital 
for many reasons. One reason is to show that HR is adding 
Shareholder Value. Most C-suite executives regard HR as a 
cost center, adding little or no value whatsoever. By showing 
that HR is creating a high and positive return it is hoped that 
this perception will change over time. The second reason is to 
make HR better. By measuring the effect and value of HR it is 
possible to assess which activities should be terminated, 
changed or enhanced. 
 
Scanning books, research and case studies it is clear that 
some HR activities receive more attention when it comes to 
measuring value. ‘Training’ is probably the area which receives 
most attention. Diversity Management has recently been 
subject to more studies – primarily from the United States – but 
measuring the effect of Diversity Management is still in its 
infancy.  
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says: 
A former award-winning London-based financial analyst, who returned to his native Denmark to complete a five year psychology degree, 
Morten Kamp Anderson – we think – has the perfect background to advise companies on their human capital strategy. ISS Denmark think 
so too, especially after his pioneering research into the financial impact and benefits of Diversity Management revealed a much better 
business case than expected. 
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ISS Denmark concluded that it had indeed produced 
Shareholder Value through its Diversity Management initiative. 
In this article I will show how this was done and which 
considerations were made along the way. Many important 
learning points were as much about the process as the results. 
I hope that this article will inspire others to try to measure HR. 
 
Background to the project 
 
ISS is one of the largest private employers in the world with 
more than 535,000 employees in more than 50 countries 
across all continents. It operates as a Facility Management 
company and offers services such as Security, Cleaning, 
Catering, Support Service, Facility Management Services and 
Property Services. Its headquarters are in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. It is owned by the equity funds EQT Partners and 
Goldman Sachs Capital Partners. 
  
ISS Denmark has over 10,000 employees. During the previous 
three years the company has focused heavily on Diversity 
Management. It has trained all its managers, changed 
recruitment and promotion processes, started many initiatives 
to create and foster a diverse culture, set diversity goals for all 
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ROI – IF USED CAREFULLY – IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE METRIC FOR MANY  HR INVESTMENTS 
“ ” 
management levels and promoted diversity in its 
communications with all its external stakeholders. ISS Denmark 
now wanted to find out if all that effort and major investment had 
also paid off through higher shareholder value. 
 
A Steering Committee was established to oversee the project of 
measuring the value of diversity and to interpret and direct the 
project. PwC did the actual collection and measurements, and 
ensured the statistical solidity of the conclusions. Finally, an 
innovation expert interviewed a number of managers, 
employees and customers to add case studies to the numbers 
PwC produced. I was a member of the Steering Committee.  
 
Why use ROI? 
 
In the beginning the focus was on both cost and benefits, and 
ROI (Return On Investment) was selected as the tool to show 
the possible financial value creation. ROI has become the de 
facto tool which HR use to show that they are adding value to 
the company's bottom line. But in addition to the obvious 
problems in actually measuring the financial benefits of many 
HR activities, the ROI calculation in itself is also something to 
be careful about. 
 
During my 11 years as a financial analyst working for 
investment banks in London, I didn't use ROI that much. I used 
more “sophisticated” metrics such as Enterprise Value metrics, 
ROIC (Return On Invested Capital), RoOFCF (Return on 
Operating Free Cash  Flow), CRONCI (Cash Return On Net 
Capital Invested) etc. What is common about all these ratios is 
that they recognise that 'return' and 'investment' are quite 
complex things. ROI on the other hand uses quite a basic 
version of both concepts. 
 
 
 
Why I still believe that ROI has a lot to offer for HR executives is 
that – if used carefully – it is the most appropriate metric for 
many HR investments. Below is a quick overview of its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
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Advantages 
Easy to understand 
Focuses on both input and output of HR activities 
Shows the bottom-line effect 
Gives HR a language to talk to top management 
Possible to make better HR investments 
Connects well with HR Balanced Score Card 
Disadvantages 
Very sensitive to few assumptions 
Reduces complex things to simple causal 
relationship and a single number 
Difficult to see important assumptions 
Too simple view of ‘investment’ and ‘benefit’ 
14 
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The Business Case for Diversity is Strong 
 
First we looked at the business case for diversity. This was 
going to help design the measurement project and to steer the 
data collection process.  
 
Diversity Management is often criticised for being something 
companies just do because it is perceived to be the right thing 
to do, that it is too soft and fluffy to measure, and that it is (too) 
costly. Research shows however, that companies which create 
a diverse workplace significantly outperform in financial and 
performance terms. A few examples: 
 
• A US study found that the average annualised return for the 
100 companies that rated highest in diversity management 
was 18.3% compared to 7.9% for the 100 lowest companies 
among Fortune 1000 companies (Bagshaw, 2004). 
 
• A study among 679 Fortune 1000 companies showed a high 
correlation between number of female top management 
members and (financial) performance (Krishnan & Park, 
2005).   
 
• A European meta-study documented that minority groups in 
general have lower absenteeism and lower employee 
turnover (Morrison, 1996). 
 
The benefits of diversity can be divided into three categories: 
 
1. Improved performance due to a better talent pool and 
improved skill base.  
2. Cost reduction from lower recruitment costs, lower 
employee turnover and fewer absenteeism days. 
3. Various ‘soft’ outcomes such as increased learning and 
innovation, the avoidance of groupthink, higher job 
satisfaction and an overall better work environment. 
  
 
 
 
 
The business case can be illustrated as follows: 
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1. True evaluation requires a baseline. Any attempt to 
measure any HR activity should always begin before the 
activity starts. Measuring and evaluating requires a 
baseline to assess the impact by comparing before and 
after.  
 
2. It is too easy to 'adjust reality' when doing it 
retrospectively. You must be able to accurately 
reconstruct the true context, behaviour and results from 
the time before the activity. That is very difficult. 
 
3. Measuring is also about assessing whether the activity 
should be done or not. Measuring is not an end in itself  – 
it is a means to create better HR. An important benefit of 
doing all the hard work before the program is to design the 
process so that it is strategic and creates the most 
shareholder value. 
 
ISS had not any baseline data so we had to design the 
measurement so that this weakness could be overcome. 
Fortunately we had all the important data going back to before 
the program started and it was statistically possible to re-
create a baseline. 
 
Design 
 
Many of the ‘traditional’ benefits of diversity were quickly 
excluded in the measurement project. The two most often 
mentioned benefits – better innovation and lower recruitment 
costs (due to the larger talent pool to hire from) – were viewed 
as too difficult to measure. Innovation is not a major factor for 
ISS Denmark and lower recruitment costs could not be 
established from the data available. 
 
Instead the focus turned towards contract profitability. ISS 
wanted to see if contracts managed by diverse teams were 
more profitable than non-diverse teams and if so why, by how 
much, and what led to this higher profit.  
 
 
 
 
 
15 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
Before the actual measurement began, ISS faced two problems 
which had to be addressed: 
 
1: The Problem With Causality 
 
It is common for many to mistake correlation with causality. We 
often assume that just because two things correlate then we 
know how to interpret this connection. Take ‘Job Satisfaction’ for 
instance. Most surveys rightly conclude that there is a positive 
correlation with ‘Productivity’. There are however (at least) three 
ways to explain this correlation: 
 
• The more satisfied you are, the more productive you are in 
your job 
• The more productive you are, the more satisfied you are with 
your job 
• A third element drives both e.g. if the match between job and 
employee is high then the employee will experience both a 
higher job satisfaction and be more productive  
 
It matters a lot in everyday practice which of the above is 
correct. Should you attempt to increase employee satisfaction, 
productivity or job/employee-fit? 
 
In this case, we had to consider whether Diversity Management 
programs lead to higher value or whether companies which 
make a high profit subsequently spend some of it on diversity 
initiatives. We made a hypothesis that diversity led to higher 
profits but we had to test this causality as we got the data. 
 
2: Thou Shalt Not Measure Retrospectively 
 
Another problem we faced was that we were measuring 
retrospectively. While it is tempting to measure retrospectively, it 
is something you generally should stay away from for (at least) 
three reasons: 
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And the Results are in ... a Higher Return Than We Had Expected 
 
The analysis concluded that the contract profitability with 
diverse teams was 3.7% higher than the non-diverse teams 
(18.5% vs. 14.8% profit margin). This is an overwhelming 
difference and indeed much higher than any of us in the 
Steering Committee had expected. Of the 3.7% improvement in 
contract profitability, 2.5% could be attributed directly to lower 
absenteeism and higher job satisfaction.  The connection 
between job satisfaction and profitability was positive for all 
teams but the diverse teams had a higher job satisfaction. 
 
The study also showed that fewer diverse teams were loss-
making than non-diverse teams. Finally the study concluded 
that top line growth was 4.4% higher in diverse teams vs. non-
diverse teams. 
 
Because the improvement of 3.7% represents such a high 
additional value it was decided not to measure the costs 
because the benefits would so obviously outstrip the total costs 
even considering all indirect costs, time and a possible risk 
involved. 
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THE CONTRACT PROFITABILITY 
WITH DIVERSE TEAMS WAS 3.7% 
HIGHER THAN THE NON-DIVERSE 
TEAMS – MUCH HIGHER THAN  
ANY OF US HAD EXPECTED 
“ 
” 
During the data collection it was important to strip out general 
and national effects such as changes in unemployment rates in 
Denmark, sector differences, economic trends and other factors 
which affect all companies and contracts. The data had to be 
‘everything-else-being-equal’.  
 
During the statistical analysis a lot of work went into describing 
the causal structure (what caused what), a high significance rate 
was used (95% – so we were fairly confident that the conclusion 
was correct) and a test for multi-colinearity was carried out (was 
there a third factor which affects both). Coupled with an analysis 
of how the introduction of diversity affected the timing of 
profitability, we concluded that the causal direction in our 
hypothesis was correct.  
 
7,261 employees in 469 teams were included in the project. All 
service functions were included: cleaning, security, facility 
management, real estate management and support services. 
Diverse teams were here defined as having no more than 70% 
from the same country, 70% of the same sex and 70% from the 
same generation. All three criteria had to be met. Also a team 
had to consist of at least five members. About 25% of all teams 
were diverse teams.  
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THE DIVERSE TEAMS HAD A 
HIGHER JOB SATISFACTION 
“ ” 
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Learning points 
 
This was an extensive effort to measure the value of an HR initiative. A lot of time was spent on data collection, data cleansing, statistical analysis, 
interviews, collecting and reading research and case studies, meetings and discussions and not least making sense of the findings. One may ask 
why so much effort should be put into measuring an activity which had already taken place. 
 
In this particular case ISS had many reasons why this effort made perfect sense. Generally one should always be careful that the measurement 
does not get its ‘own life’ and become an end in itself. The effort of measuring should always correspond to the benefit of doing it. Spending too 
much time on evaluating a training course for five people does not make sense. But in this case, ISS showed that they were earning many millions 
of Danish kroner each year because of its diversity program. The effort in this case is proportionate to the benefit. Another learning point is that 
having baseline data and doing all the thinking about business case and causality should be done prior to the activity taking place. It makes 
measuring and evaluating HR so much more easy and credible. In this case the data availability, the effort spent on this and the capability – 
especially from PwC – made it possible to re-create a baseline.  
 
Finally, HR does add value! And so much more than most expect. The CEO of ISS Denmark Maarten Van Engeland says that “this survey has 
given me a lot to consider because it so clearly demonstrates that there is a great potential in linking our business with diversity”. Perhaps this link 
would not have been so clearly understood and accepted without this survey. 
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CHASING STARS: THE MYTH OF TALENT AND THE 
PORTABILITY OF PERFORMANCE 1  
 
Boris Groysberg 
Many knowledge-based firms view their employees as their most 
valuable resource. At such companies, where it is virtually an 
article of faith that settling for “B” players is a recipe for 
mediocrity, managers work hard to attract the best and the 
brightest. When companies do find first-rate talent, they’re often 
willing to offer those stars huge salaries, signing bonuses, stock 
options – in short, whatever it takes.  
  
But reliance on stars is a highly speculative managerial policy 
because we don’t really know very much about what drives 
outstanding individual performance. Little clear-cut evidence 
supports or refutes prevailing beliefs about why some people 
excel. Both stars and their employers often assume that 
outstanding performance is the result of a combination of innate 
talent and good educational preparation. But is this the entire 
story? And if not, what is missing? 
 
Another hazard of an unexamined reliance on stars is that the 
portability of talent – or, more accurately, the prevailing belief in 
such portability – cuts two ways.  The extent to which skills are 
portable is also a compelling question for individual knowledge 
workers whose stock-in-trade is information and intellectual 
activity, whether or not they are stars in their fields.  
18 
says: 
Since Malcolm Gladwell dared to pull the rug from under the ‘war for talent’ in 2002, it is surprising that it has taken almost a decade for the 
empirical evidence to emerge that the real star is the system in which those stars shine. But as the talent war for the first time has replaced 
risk as the number one boardroom priority, such evidence is needed now more than ever. In his powerful new book, Boris Groysberg offers 
profound insights into the fundamental nature of outstanding performance and the myth of its portability.  
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Are those who excel in the workplace mobile free agents with 
highly portable skills, or is their performance primarily driven by 
adept use of the resources of the organization in which they 
thrive? An answer to this question, even an answer less cut-
and-dried than popular wisdom or theoretical formulations, 
could shed new light on pressing managerial questions about 
how to hire, develop, compensate, and retain talent. 
Determining whether the skills of knowledge workers are in fact 
portable from one firm to another – or to what degree and under 
what circumstances they are portable – can also potentially 
shed light on the accuracy of this formulation and the wisdom of 
building one’s career on it. 
 
The performance pool: financial analysts 
 
The first requirement was shared, objective, and publicly 
available criteria for measuring performance. We considered a 
number of professions, including academics, accountants, 
advertising creatives, architects, athletes, consultants, 
engineers, inventors, lawyers, money managers, and 
programmers. But we finally found a suitable labor market on 
Wall Street. 
1 Excerpted from Chasing Stars by Boris Groysberg. Copyright (c) 2010 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission. 
200 stock analysts; with research directors, traders, 
salespeople, investment bankers, and executives at 37 
investment banks; and with the institutional investors who are 
analysts’ clients. 
 
Of course, the investment-banking landscape of 2010, when 
this book was finished, looks very different than it did in 1988-
96, the years of our study. But these tumultuous events do not 
undermine our findings. If anything, the shifting fortunes of the 
industry make the book’s findings more deserving of attention. 
The more turbulent the business landscape, the more crucial it 
becomes to think strategically about performance and talent 
management. 
 
The limits of portability and the price of moving on 
 
When a star analyst changes employers, his or her general 
human capital, their education and innate abilities, general skills 
and relationships with clients, research and media contacts are 
readily portable to another employer.  But the firm-specific 
human capital, the supportive relationships and resources at the 
analyst’s former employer, which represent sources of 
performance-enhancing information and insight, are 
immediately lost.  It is this loss that, overall, leads star 
performance to decline sharply and continue to suffer for at 
least five years after moving to a new firm.  
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Wall Street equity analysts, who follow companies and stocks in 
particular industries and share their insights with their firms’ 
institutional clients, were the ideal research pool for a number of 
reasons: 
 
• Since 1972 respected trade journal, Institutional Investor, 
has compiled and published an annual ranking of the best 
stock analysts in each industry: rankings viewed on Wall 
Street and by academics as a reliable proxy for performance 
 
• Research departments collect voluminous data of other 
kinds about their analysts, as do information intermediaries 
like Thomson Financial, allowing for simultaneous 
examination of the impact of various variables on 
performance 
 
• Detailed data on moves between employers is also readily 
available for top-rated analysts 
 
• The labor market for analysts, though large enough to 
produce valid and reliable observations, is small and 
concentrated enough to lend itself well to study: to be 
specific, many top stock analysts work in Manhattan 
 
• Finally, belief that individual talent is the prime determinant 
of performance is deeply entrenched among research 
analysts and others on Wall Street (85 percent of the 
individuals we interviewed asserted that analysts’ 
performance is independent of the companies they work for 
and thus highly portable)  
 
Our research sample consisted of over 1,000 star analysts 
(ranked by Institutional Investor) at 78 investment banks. For  
comparative purposes, we also employed data on about 20,000 
non-star analysts at approximately 400 investment banks. To  
shed light on both the mechanics and the culture of the 
profession, we conducted in-depth interviews with more than  
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of becoming stars, female analysts’ 
performance became portable in a way 
that their male colleagues’ did not. 
 
Second, although they relied less on firm-
specific capabilities and relationships, 
women were more careful when 
assessing a prospective employer. They 
evaluated possible employers more  
cautiously and analyzed more factors than 
men did before deciding to uproot 
themselves from a company where they 
had been successful. Female star 
analysts, it would appear, took their work 
environment more seriously yet relied on it 
less than male stars did. They looked for 
an employer that would allow them to 
continue building successful franchises 
their own way. 
 
Finding it difficult to build relationships 
with male colleagues, they instead built 
networks of external ties to clients and to 
the industries they covered and forged 
unconventional boundary-spanning in-
house alliances. Aware of the sexism that 
pervaded investment-banking culture, they 
took care to ensure that a given bank 
would provide them the platform they 
needed to be successful and not hold 
them back on account of their gender.  
 
Exceptional male performers 
contemplating changing employers – and 
hoping to maintain their star performer 
status – would do well to emulate the 
approach taken by female star analysts.  
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THE  SUPPORTIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS AND 
RESOURCES AT THE 
ANALYST‟S FORMER 
EMPLOYER ARE  
IMMEDIATELY LOST.   
THIS LOSS LEADS STAR 
PERFORMANCE TO DECLINE 
SHARPLY AND CONTINUE TO 
SUFFER FOR AT LEAST FIVE 
YEARS AFTER MOVING TO  
A NEW FIRM. 
“ 
” This evidence refutes the prevailing belief 
in the industry that analysts’ skills are 
thoroughly portable – independent of the 
particular firm where they work – and that 
analysts can move without suffering a 
decline in performance.  What they left 
behind were the capabilities of the old 
firm and the seamless fit between their 
own skills and the resources of the 
company.  An analyst who left a firm 
where he or she achieved stardom lost 
access to colleagues, teammates, and 
internal networks that can take years to 
develop. 
 
Exceptions:   and women 
 
There were degrees of performance loss 
here. Star analysts who moved between 
firms with similar capabilities suffered an 
average of only two rather than five years 
decline in performance, and analysts who  
moved to a better firm experienced no 
significant short or long term decline in 
performance. But only star analysts who 
moved with intact teams, a phenomenon 
known as “block trading in people” were 
able to retain some firm-specific human 
capital even after moving, with 
performance-protective effects (no 
decline in short or long-term 
performance).   
 
The other group of analysts who 
maintained their star ranking even after 
changing employers were women.  There 
were two overarching explanations for 
women’s portability: 
 
First, the best female analysts appeared 
to have built up their franchises on  
external relationships with clients and the 
companies they covered, rather than on 
relationships within their firms. By 
contrast, male stars built up more firm- 
and team-specific human capital, 
investing more in the internal networks 
and  unique resources of the firms where 
they worked. Hence, in the course    
 
“the best female analysts” 
Portability and the talent myth  
 
A cascade of articles and books proclaims the existence of 
a war for talent and asserts that the increasingly 
sophisticated technological and knowledge-based tilt of 
advanced economies is creating a more efficient labor 
market and an army of footloose free agents with portable 
skills.  
 
Some writers declare that a large-scale paradigm shift is 
occurring from long-term to short-term employment, and 
that the most talented employees move most often. A 
logical corollary of this hypothesis is that the kind of 
company-specific knowledge that was once valuable to 
employer and employee no longer retains much value for 
either party. Because talent is flighty, the argument goes, 
managers need to get talented employees up to speed 
fast so they can begin contributing to the firm. An 
alternative scenario asserts that firms should lure stars 
with attractive offers and retain them with individualised 
career customisation. Few of these prescriptions are 
based on empirical evidence. 
 
The initial premise that post-industrial economies are 
increasingly dominated by knowledge-based work has 
been amply demonstrated. It is thus rational for companies 
whose services or products are knowledge-dependent to 
stake their competitive advantage largely on the talents of 
their employees, but the evidence generated by our study 
suggests a set of very different conclusions about how to 
pursue competitive advantage in a knowledge-based field.  
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Lessons for employees 
 
The central lesson is that individuals who are stars in the 
workplace have a strong and persistent – and potentially career-
damaging – tendency to undervalue the importance to their 
success of their employers’ capabilities and resources – and 
their own practiced ability to make use of these resources.  
 
For individuals who intend to stay put at their current employers, 
coming to grips with this central truth may be a little more than a 
character-building exercise in modesty and in giving credit 
where credit is due. And for stars who contemplate switching 
allegiances, they should carefully weigh an increase in 
compensation – which is likely to be their prime motivation for 
changing jobs – against the probability of a future performance 
decline. 
 
 
Lessons for employers 
 
Even though there are lessons from experience and 
observations that address how to make good hiring choices, 
how to think about compensation and integration, how to mentor 
and train stars, how to promote collaboration, and how to elicit 
loyalty, their applicability depends on the particulars of an 
organization’s orientation and mission. If not firm-specific, they 
are at least relevant to particular types of enterprises, with 
particular orientations and missions. 
 
The broadly applicable lessons that we can specify have largely 
to do with hiring. Our evidence strongly suggests the wisdom of 
hiring from firms with similar orientations and of hiring from firms 
of lesser or equivalent quality. Hiring from organizations far 
more resource-rich than one’s own increases the likelihood that 
the incoming star will suffer a performance decline and prove to 
be a disappointment. Our findings also argue for being frank 
and thorough in presenting the firm to prospective candidates in 
the interest of maximizing goodness of fit.  
 
About the Author 
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For these if for no other reasons we can still find no place for 
human capital on the asset side of the balance sheet, a  
situation that has already been described as “inconvenient” (see 
Human Capital Handbook vol.1 no.1, Feb 2011). Paradoxically, 
though, it may be possible for human capital to appear on the 
balance sheet as a liability; while, for most organisations, their 
‘biggest asset’ is its people, it is equally true that its people are 
also its biggest liability and biggest risk. In fact they are both risk 
and cost, the ‘cost’ part of the equation being reflected, partially 
and wholly inadequately, on the P&L. We have pointed out 
before that ‘cost’ is an equally inconvenient rubric for an ‘asset’. 
 
A counsel of despair then? Forget about human capital in 
accounting terms? Not at all, or at least ‘not accounting as we 
know it, Jim’. The fact that human capital cannot be reflected in 
numerical terms is a fact of life. However what can be measured 
and compared, business with business, is the skill in managing 
it. On this quality, businesses can be ranked, from top to bottom. 
 
Measuring Human Capital Management 
 
It can be taken for granted that some businesses are better at 
managing their human capital than others. Some are good at it, 
some not so good, and some are poor enough to fail. Some are 
so good (in a wide range of industries) that they may be too far  
Introduction 
 
Words can be overused to the point of losing useful meaning. 
“Human Capital” has already joined the array of expressions 
such as “engagement” and “talent management”, or “people 
are our biggest asset” that have been pressed into service so 
often, in so many contexts, and for so many different purposes, 
as to have become in many cases more a matter of sound-
bites than real meaning. 
 
“Human Capital” encounters a second hazard in the attempt to 
measure it, because in most instances this can only be 
fruitless. At the macroeconomic level it could be useful (see, 
for example, the Lisbon Council study) but my focus is on human 
capital at the level of the organisation. 
 
And while it is true that in the case of exceptional individuals – 
such as an unusually creative software designer or a gifted 
investment fund manager – huge financial gains can 
legitimately be ascribed to them, this particular case only goes 
to underline the proposition that individual human capital is 
unmeasurable. When the star individual was hired his or her 
talent was still only in potential, not as capital. Nor is there any 
guarantee that such talent is repeatable. The value of human 
capital is too volatile, too diverse and too variable in relation to 
its context to be subject to predictable values. 
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HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Michael Reddy 
says: 
Has the whole intangibles/human capital reporting project been looking in the wrong place – namely at people? With all the latest evidence 
(see the previous piece by Boris Groysberg) pointing away from star individuals to the firm’s star system, should we instead be focusing on 
and accounting for star-making people practices? Dr Michael Reddy thinks so. We do too. 
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Five questions are sufficient as a starting point: how well are you 
managing your ... 
 
• Talent? 
• Well-being Proposition? 
• People Risks? 
• Leadership Role? 
• Data? 
 
1. How well are you managing your talent? 
 
I do not mean simply the steps you are taking to recruit the 
talent you need but what processes are you using to manage it. 
And by ‘talent’ I do not mean the high flyers, big earners, star 
performers. Or rather I do mean these exceptional individuals 
who in some sectors are key critical, but talent exists at every 
level of the organisation. Not that everyone is talented because 
clearly they are not, but some talented team individuals are 
usually needed to make the top performers shine, individuals 
who are not always recognised for their worth. 
SOME BUSINESSES ARE 
GOOD AT IT,  
SOME NOT SO GOOD, 
AND SOME ARE POOR 
ENOUGH TO FAIL 
“ 
” 
2. How well are you managing your  being ?  
  
A well being ‘proposition’ necessarily means consideration for 
both the physical and psychological health of employees, but 
more than that it means the creation of a physically and 
psychologically healthy working environment. More than that 
again, it means that the well being proposition is two-way. We 
live in an age where individual choices between healthy and 
unhealthy lifestyles are open to many employees. To what 
extent therefore are employees required to live their lives so as 
to turn up fit for work? 
 
3. How well are you managing your people risks? 
  
Risk managers are commonplace in industry these days though 
their remit rarely includes (certainly not explicitly) the 
management of people risks, which are mostly beyond the 
range of insurance and are often felt as too difficult to control. 
Peoples’ behaviour is a key critical factor in every aspect of 
business life today – their skills, their personal attributes, 
including their motivation and ability to work with others – all of 
them impacting directly on the P&L and the balance sheet. The 
list of particular people risks is daunting though not extensive:  
 
• unwarranted and sometimes persistently poor 
attendance  
• unwanted and sometimes unannounced departures of 
valuable human capital 
• conflict... human capital is unlike any other (company 
cars aren’t unpleasant to each other) 
• dishonesty of all kinds: fraud of course and in difficult 
times many mundane behaviours 
• mistakes and poor decisions due to the stress of 
increased workload with fewer resources 
• poor health and unhealthy lifestyles  
 
Most managers feel themselves to be poorly equipped to deal 
with psychological issues. 
ahead of the field to be caught this year or next, even if part of 
what they do is as much intuitive as fully articulated. Some are 
so bad they don't realise how bad they are (and won't, even 
when the share price has collapsed).  
 
If we build it ... 
 
This is not just a thought piece: we’re actually building the 
indices by which a business can self-audit its Human Capital 
Management maturity; and by which financial analysts can 
audit its HCM maturity from an outsider’s point of view. But to 
do this, we’d like to hear from you. In particular, what do you 
think of this shift of emphasis from people to practices?  Where 
should the focus be: talent, risk, data, leadership, wellbeing? 
Any companies you know or work for that are – or aren’t – 
exemplars of good or bad HCM standards? 
 
Click here to join the discussion and share your thoughts. More 
than that though, carry this thinking into how you look at your 
business.  
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4. How well are you managing your leadership role? 
 
Leadership from the perspective of good human capital 
management is understood from the wider perspective of 
distributed rather than heroic leadership. An organisation that 
scores well on this factor will be allowing individuals to adopt a 
leadership role in many situations, often on a impromptu basis 
and irrespective of formal responsibilities. A curious corollary of 
such leadership is its capacity to engender “followership”. 
 
5. How well are you managing your data? 
 
The depth and quality of people data that businesses are 
capturing and putting to use these days is miles ahead of what 
it used to be. HR metrics by the ton and eye-watering 
performance management dashboards are commonplace. The 
problem is not the amount of data but the fact that it is often left 
“inert”, not interrogated or analysed further; nor does it often 
reach the Board in a form and in a language that would excite 
the FD. 
WHEN INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL DRIVES THE BUSINESS 
MODEL, THEN ...  
 
Christian Nielsen 
Introduction 
 
A business model driven by intellectual capital may in some ways 
differ from business models driven primarily by other factors, such 
as financial capital or natural resources. When intellectual capital 
drives the business model of a company then competitive 
advantage may be particularly high, margins high and corporate 
flexibility good. However, there may also be drawbacks; 
competitive advantage may be easily erodible, margins may be 
highly unstable and the management of knowledge resources and 
intellectual capital can be difficult.  
 
From an external perspective, evaluation of such businesses will 
likewise be more difficult than for those that have more traditional 
business models. This article illustrates possibilities for enhancing 
the evaluation of business models that are driven by intellectual 
capital. There are few, if any, easy pickings: analyzing, evaluating 
and measuring the performance of business models is difficult 
enough already, and for business models driven by intellectual 
capital it is even more difficult.  
 
A business model is in essence a sustainable way of doing 
business – because it stresses the ambition to survive in the long 
run and thus also the ability to stay competitive. So a business   
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With a lot of discussion out there about dispersed business models based on social media, virtual collaboration, and innovation-ability, the 
question for analysts and companies is how business models can take Human Capital into account in a clear, readable and useful way. 
Christian Nielsen offers some timely and innovative clues. 
model is not a static way of doing business. It must be 
continuously developed, nursed and optimized so that the 
company can meet changing competitive demands; it undergoes 
continual innovation.  
 
The Business Model Concept and its Coupling to Intellectual Capital  
 
A business model is never only a new pricing strategy, cost 
cutting exercise or customer retention strategy, but a way in 
which a bundle of such strategies constitute a unique business 
formula.  
 
DEFINITION: A business model describes the coherence of the 
company's strategic choices which makes possible the handling 
of the processes and relations that create value on the 
operational, tactical and strategic levels in the organization. The 
business model is therefore the platform which connects 
resources, processes and the supply of a service which results in 
the long-term profitability of the company. 
 
A business model is concerned with the strategy and value 
proposition of the company; but how is it  leveraged? We need to 
identify the most important performance measures that relate to 
the overall value creation story. 
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THE BUSINESS MODEL IS THE PLATFORM WHICH CONNECTS 
RESOURCES, PROCCESSES AND THE SUPPLY OF A SERVICE 
AND RESULTS IN THE LONG-TERM PROFITABILITY OF THE 
COMPANY  
“ 
” 
We want to illustrate the flows of value 
creation by linking indicators to strategy 
and by providing a context-giving 
narrative. Mouritsen & Larsen (2005) call 
this a process of “entangling” the 
indicators [although we might call it 
interlinking and integrating], arguing that 
individual pieces of information and 
measurements by themselves can be 
difficult to relate to any conception of value 
creation. So we are concerned with 
identifying the knowledge resources that 
drive value creation – rather than 
assigning a monetary value to them. 
 
The problem with trying to visualize the 
company’s “business model” is that it can 
very quickly become a generic and static 
organization diagram illustrating the 
process of transforming inputs to outputs 
in a chain-like fashion. The reader is thus 
more often than not left wondering how the 
organization actually functions. Hence, the 
core of the business model description 
should be the connections between the 
different elements that the  management  
review is traditionally divided into, i.e.  the 
actual activities being performed in the 
company. Companies often report a lot of 
information about activities such as 
customer relations, distribution  channels, 
employee competencies, knowledge 
sharing, innovation and risks; but this 
information may seem unimportant if the 
company fails to show how the various 
elements of the value creation 
collaborate, and which changes we 
should keep an eye on.  
 
This is where the intellectual capital 
perspective becomes imperative. When 
we perceive relationships and linkages, 
they often reflect some kind of tangible 
transactions, i.e. the flow of products, 
services or money. When perceiving and 
analyzing the value transactions going on 
inside an organization, or between an 
organization and its partners, there is a 
marked tendency to neglect or forget the 
often parallel intangible transactions 
and interrelations that are also involved.  
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The Intellectual Capital Cocktail 
 
At the Center for Research Excellence in 
Business modelS (CREBS) we have 
recently analyzed how existing “models” or 
“tools” perceive transactions and 
relationships, and we have found that they 
generally lack a conception of intangible 
transactions, which in many cases are 
the very key to understanding the value 
logic of a business model. 
 
So, to create a more meaningful analysis 
and understanding of a business model, 
we need to assemble a new cocktail of 
tools including, as essential ingredients, 
intangible transactions and relationships. 
Although our work has so far been 
primarily focused on network-based 
business models, the conclusions seem 
easily generisable to other settings.  
“a new cocktail of tools” 
The problem – as well as the prospect – with business models is that they are concerned with being different; the business needs a unique selling 
point.  So the bundle of indicators on strategy, intellectual capital, and so on, that will be relevant to analysis or disclosure will differ from firm to 
firm. The information needs to be communicated – in the firm’s strategic context, as this would show its relevance to the company’s value creation 
process. It does not make sense to insert such information into a standardized accounting regime. We would point out that if it is difficult for the 
company itself to conceptualize the business model, then it will probably be even more difficult for external parties to analyze it. At present there 
exists very little literature on the different aspects of analyzing business models. 
 
In order to analyze the interrelations of the business model it is possible to apply the ideas of a strategic narrative as presented in the Intellectual 
Capital Guideline (Mouritsen et al. 2003a). Like all other stories, this narrative has a beginning, an action and an ending – i.e. resources, activities 
and effects. This conception makes it possible to mobilize a series of questions to identify the key indicators of the business model, based 
on an understanding of the company’s strategy and the key management challenges facing the executive management. Evaluating the business 
model can therefore be done in a series of steps.  
 
1. Evaluate the identified indicators in a scorecard-like fashion in relation to a set of expected targets for each indicator.  
2. List the indicators in the analytical model presented below, which links evaluation criteria with knowledge resources. 
3. Re-evaluate the indicators by asking which ones affect each other.  
4. Check whether some of the 12 boxes have missing indicators. 
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The Analytical Model (Mouritsen et al. 2003b) 
From an accounting perspective the question of how to capture value 
creation and value transactions when value creation to a large extent 
goes on in a network of organizations and not inside an organization 
as traditionally perceived is problematic. Also, from a management 
perspective, the question of how to produce decision-relevant 
information is seriously challenged by business model innovations 
and the advance of new types of business model ecologies, e.g. 
based on social communities, virtual collaboration networks and a 
competitive landscape based on business model “innovation-ability”.  
 
Perhaps understandably, the accounting and finance 
professions have not been able to keep pace. With inspiration 
from the fields of business model innovation and developing 
business ecologies, it might be meaningful to attempt business 
model (e)valuation by incorporating 5 different archetypes of 
performance measures:  
 
1. Measures of present strength and resources 
2. Measures of resilience  
3. Measures of changeability and flexibility 
4. Measures of activity and output  
5. Measures of impact, both financial and societal  
 
 
In Conclusion  the Business Model has a Communicative Role 
 
The business model may thus also be perceived as a model which 
helps the company’s management to communicate and share their 
understanding of the company’s business logic with employees, 
business partners, and external stakeholders. But if it is incomplete, 
so is the reader’s potential perception of the company. In general, the 
potential benefits of learning how to analyze and evaluate business 
models are considerable and this is an area that many sectors, 
ranging from investment banks to consulting companies and policy-
makers should engage in.  
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5. Management should then ask themselves how all these indicators fit 
into the story of what the company does and how it is unique. In this 
manner, management is gradually moving closer to its business model 
narrative being supported by performance measures.  
6. In order to assess if the composition, structure and use of the 
company resources are appropriate, it is necessary to consider the 
development of the indicators over time. 
7. Finally, the company may pursue relative and absolute measures for 
benchmarking across time and across competitors.  
  
Unlike an accounting system, the analytical model is not an input/output 
model. There is no perception that any causal links exist between, say, 
actions to develop employees (e.g. increase employee satisfaction) and 
effects in that area. But the effects of such actions may appear as customer 
effects: for example the employee becomes more qualified and capable of 
serving the customers better. The task of the analysis is thus to explain 
these ‘many-to-many relations’ in the model. The classification itself does 
not explain the relations; an additional narrative is required. 
 
Next Step: Performance Measures 
 
It is essential to support a company’s business model story with 
performance measures. While it may be acceptable for some companies 
merely to state that one's business model is based on (say) mobilizing 
customer feedback in the innovation process, excellence would be 
achieved by explaining by what means this will be done, and even more 
demanding is justifying the effort by indicating: 1) how many resources the 
company devotes to this effort; 2) how active the company is in this matter, 
and whether it stays as focused on the matter as initially announced; and 3) 
what the effect has been, e.g. on customer satisfaction, innovation output 
etc. According to Bray, “relevant KPIs measure progress towards the 
desired strategic outcomes and the performance of the business model. 
They comprise a balance of financial and non-financial measures across 
the whole business model. Accordingly, business reporting integrates 
strategic, financial and non-financial information, is future-performance 
focused, delivered in real time, and is fit for purpose” (2010, p.6). 
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TOWARDS A PEOPLE AGENDA IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
 
I have been involved in M&A as an HRD from the commercial side – that is, leading it, or part of the team 
doing the deal. I am amazed how often HR is left out, or brought in at the last moment.  
 
Reasons go from secrecy to lack of trust in the function's ability to understand the commercial realities – but 
who is to blame for that? Bankers, lawyers and other advisers don't want another agenda at the table, but it is 
the people agenda that is needed most urgently, as the synergies are about clients, staff and assets – and 
intellectual capital is vital to retain and grow the existing base and use the diversity to expand. 
 
HR must insist on being there early to help create the internal PR, the ongoing value creation and retention of 
critical talent, besides the analysis of complex issues such as pensions, global remuneration and engagement. 
 
I always wanted to know the other party and get a feel of their culture and talent – and which issues lay in 
ambush. The numbers show that the deals are not working... 
 
Jose Santiago: letter (print version) in response to Mergers and Acquisitions: Is HR being locked out on done deals  by David Woods in HR Magazine, 
1st Aug 2011   
 
” 
“
In a knowledge-based economy, much of the value in a business lies in its people. It is therefore 
essential that HR directors sit at the top table from the outset of any consideration of future 
strategy and organisation – perhaps especially in terms of M&As where the actual value added by 
people at all levels must feature as a critical element in the cost and benefit analyses. 
 
Andrew Ades: comment in response to  by David Woods in HR Magazine, 
20th Sep 2011 
 
“ 
” 
SELL-SIDE RESEARCH: THREE MODEST REFORM 
PROPOSALS 
The reasons why sell-side research has failed to deliver on its analytical promise and the measures needed to release that potential 
 
Michael A. Mainelli, Jamie Stevenson and Raj Thamotheram1 
Executive Summary 
 
Investment banks (“sell-side”) spend several $billion2 per annum globally 
on equity research sold to investment clients (“buy-side”). Even after 
cutbacks in recent years, sell-side equity research remains a well-funded 
and high-profile activity. It ought therefore to be adding significant value to 
investors’ understanding of quoted companies. And, since sell-side 
analysts disseminate their research widely, it should also improve the all-
round quality of market information. Yet despite these sizable resources 
and high rewards (unmatched in any other field of analytical research) and 
powerful advantages, sell-side research has been clearly and consistently 
shown to: 
 
• Miss most of the major insights or turning points in company analysis3  
• Err persistently towards Buy recommendations and stances 
supportive and uncritical of current company management policies 
and or management fads4 
• Follow consensus (and company guidance) forecasts and views, 
rather than construct independent earnings models and opinions 
• Prioritise daily client marketing contact over long term development of 
fundamental research 
• As a consequence, focus on short to medium term valuation formulae 
at the expense of examining in depth the extra-financial and operating 
issues which impact the long term sustainability of business models 
and company performance 
32 
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The reason for these failures can be traced to the lack of 
transparency in commercial relationships between sell-side and 
buy-side. This lack of transparency arises because: 
 
• Buy-side institutions are loath to make open, direct and 
significant payments for specified research services 
• Instead, they opt for a maze of commercial contracts – 
across the corporate, new issue and market-making 
functions as well as commission – which mask their true 
dealing costs whilst providing broad research cover to defend 
their decisions 
• This reluctance to pay full dealing and research costs has 
shifted focus and power within investment banks towards 
corporate fee and proprietary trading income 
• Which in turn has exacerbated the conflicts for equity 
analysts between research for clients and making a 
contribution to corporate and trading income 
 
There have been three very different attempts to address these 
weaknesses. Each has had some positive impact but none have 
significantly altered the status quo. 
  
The Spitzer settlement in December 20025 aimed to eliminate 
these conflicts of interest and create a level playing field in  
High profile sell-side analysts are paid (handsomely) and given unfettered behind-the-scenes access to the businesses they research and 
publicly recommend. And yet, more often than not, they miss the mark. Here we find out why, and just as importantly how they might finally 
fulfil their potential. Something we could all benefit from. 
A similar fate awaits post-Spitzer initiatives in ‘unbundled’ 
research from non (or less) conflicted boutique broker-banks. 
The logic of quality research standing apart from corporate 
client and proprietary trading pressures is flawless. It has to be 
the logical way to raise equity research quality and 
independence. Yet few firms offering earmarked, unbundled 
research services have succeeded beyond the specialist 
boutique level. 
 
The weight of existing relationships between buy-side and sell-
side militates against such initiatives. It is arguable that only 
legally enforced separation of corporate, trading and broking 
functions (i.e. break-up of integrated investment banks) could 
achieve full transparency and independence in the supply of 
equity research. In the absence of political support for radical 
reform, the following three manageable steps would improve 
research quality: 
 
• Full disclosure by sell-side and buy-side of all commission 
contracts 
• Compulsory publication by sell-side of their recommendation 
balance (Buy/Hold/Sell) for (a) all covered stocks, and (b) 
corporate client stocks 
• Naming and shaming of corporate managements who deny 
access to non-favourable analysts (‘analyst freeze-out’) 
 
These are modest steps and simple to implement. They would 
not eradicate the failings of sell-side research at a stroke but 
they would at least make it harder for corporates and 
investment banks to conspire in neutering the analytical edge of 
equity research. And they might encourage buy-side to see their 
long term advantages in paying directly for less conflicted and 
more deeply questioning sell-side research. Given the 
persistent failures of the voluntary approach, such measures 
need to be supported by regulation or at least the imminent 
threat of it, in the absence of industry proposals with teeth. 
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which buy-side could access sell-side research on a transparent 
basis. It has improved the system of research disclosures (to 
the displeasure of many analysts who complain about ‘red 
tape’) but failed to alter the preponderance of Buy 
recommendations and favourable research on each bank’s own 
corporate clients. 
 
The launch of the Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) in Europe 
in mid-2004 sought to encourage research beyond the limits of 
short term financials. Its radical idea of linking income (5% of 
participating institutions’ annual commission total) with a public 
ranking of sell-side competency in this new type of research 
started to attract significant research efforts from a dozen or 
more bulge bracket and other leading banks. But the project 
struggled against the domination of fully bundled corporate, 
trading and commission packages and in late 2008, it merged 
into the Principles of Responsible Investment initiative leaving 
unanswered questions about how to keep pushing for change6 
Ironically, the banking crisis of 2008 (itself a classic example of 
a fundamental event which ESG research would have been 
better placed to identify) has led to retrenchment by investment 
banks from research in general and from ESG research in 
particular.7 
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IT IS ARGUABLE THAT ONLY 
LEGALLY ENFORCED 
SEPARATION OF CORPORATE, 
TRADING AND BROKING 
FUNCTIONS COULD ACHIEVE 
FULL TRANSPARENCY AND 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE SUPPLY 
OF EQUITY RESEARCH . 
“ 
” 
fast, real time, interactive spreadsheets is light years ahead of 
the equivalent in the 1980s. 
 
Similar advances have been made in the technical efficiency of 
corporate communication to investors and analysts. None of 
the insider benefits which were routinely exploited a quarter-
century ago by market professionals are now so easily 
available. Tighter rules on parity of disclosure and instant 
electronic data communication have eliminated the low hanging 
fruit of old-fashioned insider dealing. 
 
Investor relations (IR) has grown up into a genuine professional 
skill. The processes of announcement, presentation, Q&A, 
conference calls, investor ‘one-on-ones’ etc have developed 
from sporadic initiatives into standardised, measurable and 
accountable units of IR activity. Managements will always use 
the tricks of spin, slant and data overload to push-and-pull 
analysts in their direction, but the latter can no longer complain 
that they lack the informational tools to execute their 
scrutinising and valuation tasks. 
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1. The Strengths of Sell-side Research 
 
Sell-side and credit research agencies have the potential to play 
a significant, positive role in enhancing the quality of equity 
market analysis and awareness. 
 
In theory, these agencies are a hugely efficient centralised 
resource, motivated to gather and to share investment relevant 
information. Like their buy-side clients, sell-side and credit 
research analysts have powerful incentives to be right – perhaps 
even more so than the buy-side given the smaller job market in 
which they work and their higher profile. Even after recent 
cutbacks, sell-side analysts remain significantly better paid than 
those undertaking similar work in health, education, civil service, 
academia, politics, the media, mainstream corporate careers and 
even the law, accounting and consultancy. 
 
Being associated with brokerages, sell-side researchers are 
motivated to be public, if not loud, about their opinions. In 
contrast the buy-side has much less to gain from sharing data 
with others and is motivated to keep information secret. Sell-side 
research is pushed through the financial system. Sell-side 
researchers have a large effect on market perceptions about 
particular stocks. In fact, one interpretation of a sell-side 
brokerage is that it is a research (or publicity) machine with a 
brokerage attached.  
 
Theoretically, sell-side research makes a vital contribution to 
market efficiency: the collective intelligence of the market, 
aggregating divergent opinions into price setting. The sell-side 
provides shared learning about stock price formation that is 
widely available at low cost. And this learning is built upon a 
statistical framework of quantitative income, cash flow, balance 
sheet and financial ratio modelling which has grown 
exponentially in technical sophistication over the past two  
decades. The intellectual capacity of today’s sell-side analyst to  
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THE INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY OF 
TODAY‟S SELL-SIDE ANALYST TO 
CRUNCH COMPLICATED NUMBERS 
AND VALUATION FORMULAE 
THROUGH FAST, REAL TIME, 
INTERACTIVE SPREADSHEETS IS 
LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF THE 
EQUIVALENT IN THE 1980s. 
“ 
” 
This emphasis on controlling reported costs by buy-side firms 
tends also to reduce their own in-house research resource and 
increase their reliance on the sell-side research which is 
circulated to them (and all other brokerage clients) ‘free’. 
Already concerned to avoid significant quarterly under-
performance risks, such buy-side clients are naturally prone to 
converge around the consensus of this corporate-filtered, 
uncritical and dealing-biased research. This convergent 
behaviour in turn creates and exacerbates bubbles.  
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 2. The Failures of Sell-side Research 
 
Yet sell-side research has manifestly failed to deliver on this 
potential. Bar a few brave outliers, most of its vast daily e-mail 
and printed output recycles published data and promotes bland, 
consensus views with a bias towards Buy recommendations and 
uncritical views on current management policy or current 
management fads8. Where critical views are expressed, they 
mostly follow a copycat cycle of clichéd invective (“lacking 
vision”, “poor investor relations”) for currently unfashionable 
companies. The underlying cause of this empty approach is the 
opaque and inadequate payment structure between sell-side and 
buy-side.  
 
This in turn arises from the criteria under which investment funds 
(buy-side) are themselves evaluated and how these drive their 
research appetite and payment structure. Investors tend to 
evaluate buy-side performance over benchmark periods shorter 
than the life of a typical fund, e.g. quarterly for a 30 year pension 
fund. All buy-side positions are constantly subject to second-
guessing ex post. This creates a defensive culture in buy-side 
firms and a ready market for sell-side research 
recommendations which can be used to support almost any 
position. A preponderance of Buy recommendations fills their 
need to justify poor investments – “I bought Vodafone and lost a 
lot on that position, but it was recommended by Mega-Broker’s 
investment researchers”. This buy-side need reinforces the 
internal pressure on sell-side analysts for positive 
recommendations to placate fee-paying corporate clients.  
 
Investors also evaluate buy-side performance in terms of fees, 
typically excluding brokerage costs. Therefore, the buy-side 
strongly prefers that its costs somehow find their way into 
brokerage costs. Not surprisingly, a variety of costs has found its 
way into brokerage fees, such as ‘softing’. This has accentuated 
the resistance within sell-side research to the concept of 
‘unbundling’. 
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3. Conflicts of Interest within Integrated Investment Banks 
 
The steady dismantling in the US of the provisions of the Glass-
Steagall Act (resulting in its final repeal in 1999) and the UK’s Big 
Bang in 1984 have created today’s global integrated investment 
bank model. Its inherent conflicts of interest are almost too 
obvious and well documented to bear repeating. No amount of 
internal compliance rules and Chinese Walls can airbrush out of 
reality the inconvenient truth that executives operating for the 
same ultimate paymaster in the triple functions of corporate 
advisory, proprietary trading and equities research cannot ever 
act in a truly independent manner for their client. 
 
sales staff) dislike market efficiency – a former 
corporate governance analyst at one bank was 
criticised internally for making available 
governance scores to buy-side clients who didn’t 
pay as much as hedge funds for the same data. 
The problem is even worse in CRAs since 
unless the client likes the report, they may not 
pay for it. Conflicts of interest become 
entrenched and no amount of Chinese Walls, 
commitments to internal integrity and internal 
processes such as whistle blowing can reverse 
their negative impact. The disinclination of sell-
side analysts to identify laggard companies – as 
opposed to leaders – in any field exemplifies this 
mind-set. The fact that most analysts do not see 
this as important shows how institutionalised 
individuals can become in the goldfish bowl of 
investment banking. 
 
4. Corporate  Management Pressure on Analysts  
 
US academics have shown that US executives 
have been able to secure more favourable 
research ratings for their companies from 
investment banks by bestowing professional 
favours on Wall Street analysts. The study, 
carried out by Michael Clement of University of 
Texas and James Westphal of University of 
Michigan, found that by offering analysts 
favours, ranging from recommending them for a 
job to agreeing to speak to their clients, sharply 
reduced the chances of a downgrade in the 
aftermath of poor results or a controversial deal. 
The research, carried out on some 1,800 equity 
analysts and hundreds of executives, suggests 
that radical regulatory reforms of recent years 
have failed to eradicate conflicts of interest on  
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And, to misquote Jane Austen, it is a truth 
universally acknowledged that a banker in 
possession of a good corporate client (or indeed 
a trader in possession of a sizable long or short 
position) must be in want of a co-operative 
research analyst.9 In short, the dice are loaded 
against independence and integrity in the equity 
research division.  
 
The analysts in sell-side and credit research 
agencies are fully aware that they work in a 
conflicted business model and that, since the 
demise of equities commission rates in the wake 
of de-regulation, their own funding depends on 
corporate and trading income. Spitzer (see 10 
below) may have broken the direct, formal link  
between corporate income and research 
rewards, but the invisible link is more powerful 
than ever. For most normal people, this inevitably 
leads to self-censorship, a process which is 
generally insidious and rarely explicit. It does not 
take more than the occasional analyst to be 
made “an example of” – i.e. who says something 
negative about an important client, doesn’t 
retract/apologise and who then is “let go” – for 
the message to get through to most analysts. 
Why risk a highly paid position for a concept of 
integrity which the system neither recognises nor 
values? This informal system of self-imposed 
control augmented with the occasional action 
pour encourager les autres is thus highly 
effective. 
 
Within the investment banking system, the power 
hierarchy is clear – research analysts are not the 
top dog. Some of these top dogs (e.g. M&A deal 
makers) react very badly to upset  corporate 
clients. Other top dogs (e.g. proprietary  traders,  
Jane Austen: “it is a truth 
universally acknowledged” 
Image source CC-BY  
IN SHORT, THE 
DICE ARE 
LOADED 
AGAINST 
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RESEARCH 
DIVISION 
“ 
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managements as to what was 
(un)acceptable to shareholders. These two 
qualities – depth of experience and 
operational knowledge – do not feature on 
the tick-lists of investment bank recruiters 
in the 21st century. Their selection system 
is more rigorous, fair and competitive than 
at any time in the history of banking. Sell-
side firms attract the brightest and the best 
(first and upper second class) honours 
graduates and MBAs from the leading 
universities and business schools across 
the US, UK and Europe. They train them in 
the disciplines of CFA and other financial 
analysis courses to high levels of 
spreadsheet modelling and ratio crunching 
ability. Intellectual and analytical rigour are 
paramount and have played their part in 
raising  technical standards of equity 
research since the ‘amateur’ 1980s. Yet 
few analysts can claim any operational or 
hands-on experience outside these narrow 
confines of tracking the reported and 
forecast financial performance of their 
sector companies. And that sector choice 
itself tends to be a serendipity outcome 
from the first postgraduate year rather than 
a reflection of special interest or 
knowledge. This focus on excellence in 
financial modelling at the expense of 
hands-on operational insight generates two 
negative side-effects. It reinforces the 
disinclination amongst analysts to examine 
extra-financial issues  such as 
environmental impacts or corporate 
governance (see 8 below) which affect the 
long-term sustainability of a company’s 
business model. And when an analyst’s  
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Wall Street. Analysts' representatives said 
that accepting favours such as those 
described in the study – which also include 
putting analysts in touch with executives at 
other companies and advising on personal 
matters – was unethical. However, 
according to the study nearly four out of 
six Wall Street analysts admitted receiving 
favours from company executives. The 
frequency of favours increased in line with 
the shortfall between the company’s 
earnings and market expectations – a 
crucial determinant of analysts' stock 
ratings.10  
 
The converse to such charm offensives by 
corporate managements towards analysts 
is, of course, the “stick” of punishing 
critical analysts with a reduction or even 
cessation in contact, information flow and 
response to questions. This is the 
corporate version of the standard device 
regularly and (till they lose office and 
popularity) successfully deployed by 
government ministers and spin-doctors to 
manipulate journalists.11 This “freeze-out” 
of an inconvenient analyst stops one step 
short of the less frequently used nuclear 
option of a formal complaint by the 
company to his paymasters. Ironically, the 
former lower level option is the more 
insidious and usually more effective one. 
Subject to the all-important proviso that no 
corporate fee is at risk (see 4 above), 
being the subject of a formal complaint 
from a covered company can be turned  by 
a confident analyst into an honourable war 
wound signifying valour. The less  
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glamorous inconvenience of losing regular 
contact for those minor but vital daily 
details of data feedback is more likely to 
wear down the analyst’s resistance and 
what is left of his independent spirit. 
 
5. Dearth of   Experience Amongst 
Analysts 
 
Excess trust in efficient market theory was 
one of the (if not the) defining self-
deceptions in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. 
It is now more than ever clear that markets 
do not tend systemically towards an 
equilibrium around an efficiently filtered 
discounting of all known and knowable 
information. Instead, they fluctuate violently 
around massive mis-readings of 
fundamental trends at macro and company 
levels. Animal spirits play their part but 
equally deficiencies in the market 
professionals’ analytical toolkit contribute to 
the market’s errors of judgement and 
pricing. 
 
No system is foolproof against corporate 
misdeeds, self-deception and cover-up on 
the scale of those perpetrated in the global 
banking sector and debt markets over the 
first decade of the new millennium. 
 
Yet it is arguable that a greater depth of 
experience and operational knowledge 
amongst professional analysts at the 
centre of equity market valuation could 
have improved awareness – as well as 
providing critical feedback to corporate  
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6. Flight from Small Cap to Higher-Fee Large Cap Coverage 
 
Before addressing the neglect of extra-financial issues and the 
struggles of EAI to correct this, it is worth noting another 
negative side-effect from the pressure on sell-side research to 
justify its costs to its investment banking paymaster. According 
to Reuters Research, there was a 13 percent increase in the 
number of US companies that lost sell-side coverage completely 
between 2002-4. Anecdotally, the growing struggles in recent 
years of many quoted UK companies in the £100m-£300m 
market cap range to attract coverage beyond the one committed 
appointed broker analyst and desultory interest from a couple of 
smaller sell-side firms illustrates this same point. As the senior 
editor of CFO.com notes: “…analysts who work for the sell-side 
research units of large brokers and investment banks are 
heading en masse for the economic shelter of large-cap 
companies. The reason for the exodus? Large-caps boast 
heavily-traded stocks – and their whopping fees – as well as the 
potential for profitable investment banking business.”15 Such 
harsh economics will be accentuated through the credit crisis. 
 
7. Neglect of Extra-Financial and Sustainability Issues 
 
We have alluded at various points in this paper to the minimal 
attention directed by sell-side analysts towards ‘extra-financial’ or 
Environmental Social & Governance (ESG) issues. This term 
refers to the range of forces outside the company’s immediate 
operations which are unlikely to influence its three-year earnings 
and cash flow forecasts (i.e. the daily working tools of an equity 
analyst) but which will drive its long term performance and even 
existence. With few exceptions, sell-side researchers do not 
generally pay due attention to the extra financial performance of 
the companies. 
 
This observation was endorsed in a recent study of banking 
sector sell-side analysts, whose authors conclude16: 
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excellence in pure financial modelling and valuation is 
endorsed by high status survey recognition (Institutional 
Investor, Extel) and the pursuit of head hunters, it often isolates 
him on a pedestal of self-belief and resistance to queries and 
ideas emanating from outside the bubble of financial market 
numbers and gossip. 
 
Such a mindset becomes suspicious of new approaches to 
investment analysis and loyal to the apparently proven formula 
of crunching the income, cash flow, balance sheet and 
valuation numbers. Doing things differently risks being seen as 
unprofessional if not illegal. Whether this risk is in the heads of 
practitioners or ‘real’ doesn't matter – it has the same effect. 
Work on building a new theory of investment is only just starting 
and the component parts12 have yet to be linked in a coherent 
way. There are, however, encouraging moves by CFA 
Institute13 and EFFAS14 but it is early days. It would need a 
significant change in buy-side demands to shift sell-side 
research analysts out of their existing comfort zone of excess 
reliance upon financial modelling. The time investment required 
for sell-side to embrace fully the extra-financial issues would be 
seen as an unjustifiable risk unless endorsed by a widescale 
buy-side shift towards measures such as the Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative. 
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CHANGE IN BUY-SIDE 
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Secondly, the vast majority of buy-side 
firms do not have the internal capacity and 
resources to operate complex comparative 
models of the kind that sell-side houses 
do. Thus, only a few of the biggest buy-
side firms have the ability to do in-depth 
primary investigation, comparing ESG 
performance of different companies in the 
same sector, and then bring it into a 
systematic model. In the same way the 
buy-side pay the sell-side to produce 
earnings estimates, so most buy-side firms 
need a similar service on the importance 
of ESG performance. 
 
8. False Signals Between Sell-side and 
Corporate Management 
 
The exchange between sell-side and 
corporate management is a two-way 
street. It is not just confined to the kinds of 
carrot-and-stick pressure applied by the 
latter to the former, as described in 5 
above. The approach of sell-side analysts 
sends signals back to management about 
equity market priorities and likely 
reactions. The broad perception amongst 
CEOs and CFOs is that mainstream 
analysts rarely initiate discussions of 
corporate responsibility or governance nor 
of environmental and safety issues, except 
when these are seen as posing specific 
and immediate threats to financials and 
value (e.g. the US refinery problems of BP 
in 2006). With buy-side analysts having 
only an hour with senior management, it is 
perhaps understandable that priorities 
have to be tightly set.  
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“Corporate governance reporting 
(mandatory under listing rules under UK 
‘comply or explain’) was usually unread 
because governance in UK banking was 
generally trusted by the analysts. Social 
and environmental reporting was 
universally considered  irrelevant and 
incapable of influencing a financial 
forecast. It was rarely read by analysts and 
any suggestion that the environmental 
reporting might contain disclosure germane 
to the he description of secondary (i.e. loan 
book) environmental risk was dismissed.”  
 
This systemic blind spot in the coverage of 
commercial research providers has a 
double impact on the capacity of fund 
managers to address these long term 
fundamental issues in their investment 
decisions. 
  
Firstly, the neglect of extra-financial issues 
in the mainstream of commercial sell-side 
research has a ‘permissive’ effect in 
skewing the market consensus away from 
the long term fundamentals. This acts as a 
disincentive to contrarian behaviour, as 
and when the buy-side may consider taking 
a bet against their benchmarks and the 
herd. The absence of credible external 
data or research to back them up implies 
an extended period of exposure to risk as it 
takes time (often several years) for the 
market to understand the true implications 
of that extra-financial insight. Companies 
(and whole sectors) can mask serious 
underlying problems for several years 
before being forced to acknowledge the  
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impact in their reported numbers. The 
unlucky demise of some bearish analysts 
during the lead up to the 2000 dot.com 
bubble showed how hard it can be to 
sustain a contrarian stance against the herd 
in the absence of a serious mainstream 
body of extra-financial research. 
 
 
 
THIS BLIND SPOT HAS A 
DOUBLE IMPACT ON THE 
CAPACITY OF FUND MANAGERS 
TO ADDRESS LONG TERM 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN 
THEIR INVESTMENT DECISIONS. 
“ 
In that instance, it would only have required 
three or four major sell-side firms to set 
aside research resource into the 
exaggerated economics of valuations based 
on “£X,000 per  subscriber” to cap the 
bubble early and thus defuse and dilute the 
subsequent volatility. The relevant research 
work would have been detailed, onerous 
and time-consuming. In order to pinpoint 
and “prove” the bubble’s over-valuation of 
dot.com stocks, researchers would have 
needed to look beyond individual 
companies towards the whole “new 
economy” and construct a model  
aggregating the “value per subscriber” for 
the sub-sector. Such research was 
eminently do-able but would have  taken 
many analysts away from daily client 
contact for a couple of months or more. 
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To its detriment, it took up the challenge. The company 
expanded into areas in which it had no specific assets, 
expertise or experience… Had management not met Wall 
Street's predictions with its own hubris, the result could have 
been different.”17 Few CEOs are spared the pressure: “The 
investment community has no sense of social responsibility. 
And when I say ‘no’, I can’t use smaller words than that.” The 
fact that this was said by Chuck Prince is particularly telling.18 
 
The question has also been considered by Duke University 
economists who found CFOs had a strong propensity to trade 
off productive expenditure (see below) in order to “meet the 
number”. 
40 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
But the top half dozen sell-side analysts in any sector have 
greater access to management, extending up to two days per 
visit and a week for overseas trips. Their inclination to deal with 
extra-financial issues only en passant or not at all during such 
visits gives a clear, and negative, signal to corporate 
management. 
 
There are several anecdotal examples of this. As noted 
commentators Michael Jensen and Robert Fuller say: “Enron in 
its heyday owned significant assets, made true innovations in its 
field and had a promising future. Its peak valuation required the 
company to grow extremely vigorously…. 
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Figure 1:   
Taken from Graham, John R., Harvey, Campbell R. and Rajgopal, Shivaram, 
"Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions" (September 6, 2006). 
Alter accounting assumptions (e.g. Allowances, pensions, etc) 
Decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising, maintenance) 
Delay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value 
Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter) 
Provide incentives for customers to buy more product this quarter 
Draw down on reserves previously set aside 
Postpone taking an accounting charge 
Sell investments or assets to recognise gains this quarter 
Repurchase common shares 
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Spitzer justified his decision to drop the indictments (which were 
supported by unequivocal evidence of research deception by 
Wall Street analysts to protect corporate clients) on the grounds 
that his main objective was to resolve the banks’ conflicts of 
interest. But as Robert Kuttner prophetically wrote in Business 
Week at the time, 
 
“Will the settlement do that? By requiring analyst compensation 
to be based solely on analyst performance, and by erecting a 
management wall between research and investment banking, 
the deal does make it much harder for research analysts to 
illegally promote stocks that their investment banker colleagues 
are underwriting. However, the other major element, the promise 
to stop spinning IPOs, is voluntary for now. An official regulatory 
ban awaits SEC rules. The nub of the problem is that Wall Street 
and its regulators remain far too clubby. Self-regulation is 
delegated to the NASD, the stock exchanges, and the 
accounting profession, which lack the appetite to go after the 
conflicts that enrich their brethren. The opportunities for insiders 
to profit from conflicts of interest are pervasive.”19 
 
The Spitzer settlement led to furious activity by investment 
banks to be seen to be strengthening their Chinese Walls. 
These included a series of moves to tighten up disclosure in 
research publications on: 
 
• Any actual or potential corporate income interest which the 
bank held in any of the companies covered by the research 
note 
• The historic timing and performance of stocks against their 
recommendations 
• The balance of the firm’s stock recommendations between 
Buy, Hold and Sell. 
 
That these changes had made some impact is evidenced by that 
most reliable of indicators – the rumbling of complaints by 
analysts against ‘red tape’.  Procedures are undoubtedly tighter 
than a decade ago  and analysts more circumspect  and careful  
 
 
41 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
9. Three (Struggling) Initiatives to Raise Research Quality 
 
Our exposure here of the flaws in sell-side research is neither 
original nor controversial. Few participants on either buy-side or 
sell-side disagree with the broad observations about conflicts of 
interest and lack of transparency in the payment structure. 
Defenders of the existing system used to rely instead on the 
pragmatic argument that with the gradual waning of Glass-
Steagall and introduction of Big Bang the global economy had 
enjoyed a quarter-century of unprecedented and almost 
uninterrupted growth in wealth and GDP from 1982 to 2007. If it 
ain’t that broke, why fix it? 
 
The credit crunch of 2008 took the wind out of that argument’s 
sails but articulate proponents can still be found for the 
plausible pragmatic line that in a free market economy money 
attracts quality. Thus the bulge bracket banks – with all their 
flaws – will continue to enjoy the most brilliant concentration of 
analytical brainpower and only their integrated model can afford 
to fund that brainpower from its mix of corporate, trading and 
commission income. 
 
Three attempts over the past decade to challenge that 
domination of the integrated model are worth highlighting: 
 
• The Spitzer settlement of 2002 
• The Enhanced Analytics Initiative 
• Unbundling initiatives by independent research houses 
 
9.1.The Spitzer Settlement 
 
Elliot Spitzer, then Attorney General for New York state, agreed 
in December 2002 to drop a series of indictments for fraudulent 
misuse of research against several of Wall Street’s top sell-side 
firms such as Merrill Lynch and Citigroup in return for fines 
totalling $1.4billion and agreements to separate and ringfence 
their research activities from the corporate, trading and other 
functions of the investment banks. 
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twenty members and acted as the catalyst for several sell-side firms 
developing in-house ESG capacity.20 
 
EAI was a highly innovative and, in its own terms, successful 
project. The project has now merged with the PRI whose much 
greater funds – $15 trillion – expand the potential impact, provided 
they make use of the following lessons from the experience of 
implementing the EAI. 
 
It is important that PRI members do more than they currently have 
committed to do on encouraging sell side research on material ESG 
aspects of corporate performance – i.e. allocate credible amounts, 
be transparent, institute benchmarking process which will drive this 
upwards, and prioritise within their evaluation process, the 
"mainstreaming" of ESG analysis and not niche report production. 
 
We hope this will happen as a result of the learning and stronger 
leadership post this crisis but we aren't confident it will. 
 
Therefore we are proposing regulator nudges which will shift the 
culture of interactions between buy and sell side and which should 
make it possible for buy side and asset owner leadership to 
emerge.  
 
Sell-side reaction to EAI showed that: 
 
• There is weak engagement of analysts in North America, 
Australia and Emerging Markets, the former being most important 
given most global firms have their HQ there. The global reach of 
even bulge bracket firms is found wanting when seeking to 
spread awareness of corporate governance and extra-financial 
issues against the grain of local worldviews. 
• Sell-side firms found it easier to write specialist SRI/ESG 
research notes for new clients than to integrate the insights into 
the mainstream notes which have much more market impact.  
• Sell-side firms found it easier to comment on climate change than 
corporate governance. Similarly coverage of the financial sector 
was very weak and shown minimal grasp of the corporate 
governance and risk issues leading up the credit crisis.  
42 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
in their handling of data and recommendations. Yet the 
preponderance of Buy recommendations (running at four to five 
times Sell recommendations) is unchanged, as is the favoured 
treatment of corporate stocks. The disclaimers on corporate 
involvement are of the lengthy catch-all variety which reveal little 
insight. Every research note into almost every company carries a 
similar disclaimer as to the possibility that it might provide revenue 
to the bank’s corporate division. 
 
Spitzer and its descendants may have tightened up investment 
bank procedures but they have not shifted the balance of power 
away from the corporate and trading divisions of the bulge bracket 
firms. Even the credit crisis has not achieved that since, although 
some names have disappeared and the investment bank model has 
suffered the mother of all PR disasters, the show will roll on under 
new ownership (part Fed, part Bank of America, part HM Treasury, 
part sovereign wealth funds) and, as the resurgence of many 
Lehman mover-and-shakers under the Nomura label illustrated, the 
same internal dynamics will re-assert itself over independence and 
integrity in research. 
 
9.2. Enhanced Analytics Initiative 
 
The EAI is a voluntary initiative which was started in mid-2004 by 
European pension funds and fund managers. It aimed to encourage 
the sell-side to invest in quality, long-term research which would 
consider material extra-financial issues. The Initiative set up two 
incentives for research providers to compile  better and more 
detailed analysis of extra financial issues within mainstream 
research. These were a commitment to allocate 5% of broker 
commissions to those brokers who did good ESG work, and 
publicity for the best performers by naming and acclaiming the 
winners (and using this winning list to concentrate the payment so 
making it meaningful). Over a four  year period, EAI grew to include 
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From the buy-side firms who did not join EAI and did not do something 
comparable on an independent basis, it became clear that: 
 
• The gap between funds’ espousal of long term responsible research 
and their giving a financial commitment to reward such research is 
large and widespread 
• Fear of internal debate and tension in part explains buy-side firms’ 
reluctance to make formal commission allocations to specified kinds of 
extra-financial research 
• This is accentuated by the dispersal of decision-making over sell-side 
research to many individual fund managers, which tends to endorse 
existing favoured practice 
• This leads to the chicken-and-egg argument that ESG related research 
lacks the quality to justify taking 5% of the commission budget – which 
in turn deprives it of the extra funding which would help to deliver that 
quality 
• It is hard to innovate in such a regime dominated by suspicion of new, 
untried methods and preferring a known formula 
 
From those buy-side firms who did join EAI and try to support this 
initiative, it became clear that: 
 
• It is hard to take a leadership position when the rest of the market, 
especially clients and investment consultants more or less ignore a 
voluntary initiative – eventually energy fades and senior management 
attention drifts. Whilst it may be true that “we cannot have sustainable 
retirement income without sustainable financial markets”,21 pension 
executives do not have, as part of their day to day priorities, the task of 
looking after the long term health of the economy as a whole. 
• Although firms made the commitment to join, there were questions from 
sell-side participants about whether the commitment was actually 
translated into practice. It would not be surprising if the factors referred 
to in the above paragraph were not also, to some degree, present 
amongst EAI members since the commitment to join comes from the 
CEO/CIO and the implementation mechanism for commission happens 
far below him or her. 
In summary, it is certain that a project like EAI can 
act as the catalyst for innovation. It is unlikely that 
such a project, by itself, can cause systematic 
change in how sell-side process ESG issues, not 
least because of the challenge of changing the way 
buy-side actually allocate commissions in the 
absence of either client or regulator interest. 
 
9.3. Voluntary Unbundling 
 
The debate around Spitzer and conflicts of interest 
did generate an upsurge of interest in the concept of 
“unbundled” research and a series of start-ups. 
These were based either on well known sector 
analysts marketing exclusively specialist research or 
on enterprising boutique brokers latching on to the 
independence & integrity argument as an ideal 
marketing tool to sell their agency services (trading 
as well as research) against the more opaque 
product of the integrated investment banks. 
 
Several firms in both these categories have 
flourished during the 2003-07 bull run in equity 
markets but not on a broad enough scale to make a 
dent in the domination of research from the 
integrated houses. Despite the intuitive arguments in 
favour of such independent research during the 
radical re-shaping of values which has occurred 
through the credit crisis, there is little evidence to 
suggest that these unbundled sell-side boutiques 
are likely to hold up better during the downswing of 
the cycle. 
 
43 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 - POWERED BY HUBCAP 
1. SPITZER SETTLEMENT  
2. ENHANCED ANALYTICS INITIATIVE 
3. VOLUNTARY UNBUNDLING  
SELL-SIDE RESEARCH: 3 MODEST REFORM PROPOSALS  |  MAINELLI, STEVENSON AND THAMOTHERAM 
Moreover: “Numerous studies in recent years have shown that the 
value of traditional research reports has been on the wane, while 
other factors, including direct analyst service and management 
access are becoming the core source of value for the buy-side. 
However, the continued production of research reports by most sell-
side and alternative research providers suggests that many have 
not understood this dramatic shift in perceived value.” 
 
Put simply, clients have a right to know how their money is spent. 
Hence regulators should require all buy-side firms report to their 
clients: what goes to research/company access/trading and how it 
spread between sell-side firms. In addition, buy-side should disclose 
any related business arrangements with sell-side firms (eg stock 
lending, prop trading etc). As with the sell-side, associations 
representing buy-side should be given an opportunity to develop a 
standardised and appropriate framework but if this cannot be done 
in due time, the regulators should make clear they will define such a 
framework for the sector. 
 
10.2. Analysis of Recommendation Balance 
 
One consequence of the Spitzer deal is that all sell-side firms now 
report, in some way, on the independence of their 
recommendations. At present, most brokers simply give the 
percentage of investment banking clients in each of the categories 
they monitor (generally buy, sell and hold). The only way to confirm, 
at least statistically, that their research and  investment banking 
divisions are indeed independent of each other is to see if the 
proportion of investment banking clients in each category is about 
the same. Comparison between brokers, on the other hand, is not 
always possible, and even when it is,  this information is never 
explicitly presented and requires some amount of calculation. What 
would be much more useful to the readership of these reports would 
be a common standard to bring some uniformity, and hence better 
comparability to their disclosures. Morgan Stanley comes closest to 
this recommendation, in that it provides the number of companies in 
each category for companies covered as well as investment 
banking clients, and is the only broker to show explicitly the contrast 
between the buy:hold:sell numbers for all companies and those for  
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10. Three Simple Proposals for Modest Reform 
 
Two radical measures could eradicate most of the flaws in sell-side 
research which have been identified in this report. First, the buy-side 
could fund the creation of a wholly independent financial analyst 
profession. Excellent advances have been achieved over the past 
decade by the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute in this 
direction, but this remains a voluntary regime largely funded by the 
sell-side. 
 
Second, the integrated structure of the sell-side could be forcibly 
unbundled via legal break-up of the corporate, trading and 
investment advisory functions. 
 
The latter is frankly too radical a measure for politicians and 
regulators in the USA or Europe.22 Today, such change is described 
as “too risky” given financial markets. And when markets are doing 
well, such change is “patently unnecessary”. Sell-side break-up 
combined with the creation of an independent analyst profession, 
accountable to the buy-side, may be the only route towards root-and-
branch reform of current research constraints and distortions. Yet in 
the absence of what is needed, there are three much simpler and 
easier-to-implement measures which could at least reduce the scope 
for undermining analyst independence. 
 
10.1. Full Disclosure of Research Payment Contracts 
 
Currently, the buy-side is effectively paying for research using client 
money and there are serious questions to be asked in terms of value 
for money. As recently stated by respected commentators Integrity 
Research: “the buy-side's reliance on sell-side firms for access to 
company management seems to us to be a rather suspect part of the 
value proposition of their research offering. Not only is it unclear how 
one can argue that management access is actually research, but it is 
also surprising that large buy-side firms continue to pay for a 
‘concierge service’. Large buy-side firms should be able to get 
access to most  company  management teams they want to meet, 
thereby  eliminating the need to pay so much to the sell-side to 
arrange these meetings.”23 
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11. Post-Script on the Real Purpose of Regulation 
 
Regulation cannot change culture by itself but it can trigger governance 
changes within organisations and between clients/suppliers. What is 
needed is a ‘nudge’ approach to regulation which triggers new 
behaviours.26 
 
For instance, promoting disclosure of comparable buy:hold:sell  ratios 
would cause management to be interested in their relative performance 
on this issue and to monitor this indicator over time. As part of a 
balanced scorecard approach, it could lead to greater introspection and 
accountability than there has been to-date, not least because clients, 
and potentially regulators could ask outliers to explain. And it provokes a 
TQM Improvement approach by harnessing market forces. For example, 
the average buy:hold:sell ratio is about 49:39:12 27. It is unclear why any 
house should think there are more buying opportunities than selling, and 
it is even more unclear why all houses should think this. Transparency 
and competition could well bring the ratio to more what it should be if 
long-term investment is the primary purpose of markets – namely mort 
holds and equivalent numbers of buy and sell. 
 
This is just one example of how well crafted regulation can result in 
behaviour and culture change. That change has to be grounded in a new 
way of working which has many dimensions including: a different, more 
discerning type of board director; design of compensation which places 
greater focus on the longer term and on risk; stronger human capital 
management culture28 – put simply, a greater focus on an integrated 
approach to sustainable financial markets.29 The ideological ‘voluntary 
only approach’ has been singularly ineffective in general and particularly 
so in terms of the market failures in investment research supply.30 So too 
has old style punitive regulation. It is high time we learnt to use 
regulation more effectively and more quickly. Given the future role of 
Cass Sunstein in regulatory cost-benefit analysis in the US31, there are 
grounds for optimism that these three proposals could soon be put into 
effect, especially if asset owners and opinion-shapers make clear their 
support and regulators take a longer-term and systemic approach to 
evaluating costs and benefits and learn the lessons of regulatory 
capture. 
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investment banking clients. There should also be a 
historical track record: currently brokers provide only the 
latest statistics. Since this is likely not to be quick or 
easy for brokers to agree on an entirely voluntary 
basis to do what they would prefer did not happen – 
i.e. easy comparisons – regulators in key markets 
should jointly give brokers a reasonable time period 
in which to deliver an acceptable reporting 
framework, or face an imposed one.24 
 
10.3. Naming-and-Shaming of Corporate -  Tactics 
 
One of the many things that now out-going SEC 
Chairman Christopher Cox indicated that his agency's 
staff would look into and fully intended to ‘tackle’ was the 
problem of company’s freezing out analysts that wrote 
negatively about the company, a goal which remains 
unmet. As David Weild IV, a former official at Nasdaq, 
notes, analyst freeze-outs remain "the rule rather than the 
exception.”25 Such freeze-outs have a negative impact on 
the firm’s ability to deliver access to senior management, 
something which the buy-side are increasingly wanting. It 
also reduces the analyst’s knowledge of sensitive news. 
 
Regulators should require all research firms, as a 
condition of their license to operate, to report 
companies which do this. Firms that do not report 
such freeze-outs should be fined. Such action would 
soon expose company management who take these 
decisions to scrutiny from board directors, media and 
investor scrutiny: bullying is harder in the open. In 
advance of such regulation, investor trade associations 
could play the same role but as always with voluntary 
whistle blowing initiatives, they will not be adequate in all 
countries and in all situations, so hence the need for 
regulatory action. What, for example, would a trade 
association do if it had to embarrass one of its own 
powerful members? 
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Notes 
 
1 The authors are participants in the Network for Sustainable Financial Markets www.sustainablefinancialmarkets.net and are writing in their private capacity. Please send 
feedback to jamieroger.stevenson@virgin.net 
2 Global investment banking revenue estimates vary between US$42bn and US$83bn. Even if only 10% is spent on equities research, this amounts to between US$4bn and 
US$8bn annual global research spend. 
3 Examples of significant missed turning points include widescale earnings manipulation in the 1980s, dotcom bubble in the 1990s, Enron and other off-balance sheet scams, 
BP’s safety exposure, dividend cuts in the early 1990s and now again in 2008/9, bank balance sheet failures etc 
4 Are security analysts fashion victims? The Core Competence Case, Ann-Christine Schulz and Alexander Nicolai, University of Oldenburg, 2008 
5 New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer agreed to drop cases against major Wall Street banks for fraudulent research in return for $1.5bn fines and agreements to 
separate research functions more clearly from trading and corporate, and to make more transparent statements about conflicts of interest 
6 What’s the future for ESG broker research, Hugh Wheelan, www.responsible-investor.com, 22/12/08 
7 Sell side firms who closed their ESG units in 2008 include Citi, Deutsch Bank and JP Morgan. 
8 Are security analysts fashion victims? The Core Competence Case, Ann-Christine Schulz and Alexander Nicolai, University of Oldenburg, 2008 
9 “It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.” Opening lines of Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen (1821). 
10 “Study reveals cosy relations between chiefs and analysts”, Financial Times, Francesco Guerrera, Ben White and David Wighton (27 July 2007) 
11 Immortalised in the telephone reply to former New Statesman editor John Kampfner from Tony Blair’s communications director Alistair Campbell, “Shut up and take this 
down, if you want any more from where this is coming from.” 
12 See for example, Keith Ambachtsheer’s work on "Integrative Investment Theory", Andrew Lo's work on "Adaptive Markets Hypothesis", Woody Brock's work on 
"Endogenous Risk", Avinash Persaud on new risk thinking. 
13 The CFA Institute has always had a focus on personal ethics, although this personalised approach may have hindered focus on the systemic faults. CFA has broadened its 
focus to include corporate governance analysis and has further expanded this by considering compensation and ESG analysis: http://www.cfainstitute.org 
14 The EFFAS has set up a commission on ESG which is seeking to define key indicators and also produce a training programme: http://www.effas-esg.com/ 
15 The Flight of the Sell-side Analyst, Marie Leone, www.cfo.com (8 July 2004) 
16 Analysts’ perspectives on the materiality of voluntary narratives in annual reports. Dr David Campbell, & Richard Slack, ACCA (November 2008) 
17 Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen: "End the Myth-Making and Return to True Analysis," The Financial Times (22 January 2002) 
18 *Business Leadership in Society”, M Blowfield & B K Googins, The Centre for Corporate Citizenship, Boston College, October 2006 
19 Robert Kuttner, Business Week, (May 2003) 
20 Other key drivers have been the voting surveys like Institutional Investor and Thomson Extel (which define bonuses) 
21 Quote from Keith Ambachtsheer in Pension funds could show the way, Pauline Skypala, Financial Times, (4 January 2009) 
22 A Tame Regulator for the SEC, Robert Kutner, www.prospect.org, (18 December 2008) 
23 The Changing Value of Investment Research, Integrity Research, (29 July 2007) 
24 The precedent has been set in recent Government/Finance sector discussion in many countries. For example, according to Bloomberg, the Federal Reserve gave U.S. 
futures exchanges less than a week to present written plans on how they would make the $55 trillion credit swaps market less risky (28 October 2008). 
25 Coming Distractions, John Goff, www.cfo.com (1 April 2006) 
26 http://www.nudges.org/ 
27 Unpublished analysis, Shaunak Meweda, AXA IM (2008) 
28 It is almost unimaginable that McKinsey reports – accurately in the authors’ experience – that banks face a talent shortage! Given the compensation packages paid, this 
highlights the huge weaknesses at the core of the sector’s approach to sustainable value creation: A Talent Shortage for European Banks, McKinsey & Co Quarterly, July 2008 
29 www.sustainablefinancialmarkets.net 
30 Self-Regulation Means No Regulation, William Buiter, Financial Times (10 April 2008) 
31 The Sunstein Appointment: More Here Than Meets the Eye, www.progressivereform.org, (9 January 2009) 
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Executive bonuses - especially in the form of 
stock and option grants - represent the most 
prominent form of legal corruption that has 
been undermining our large corporations and 
bringing down the global economy. 
 
Henry Mintzberg: No more executive bonuses! Wall Street Journal, November 2009  
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Part II provides the central body of evidence that shows why 
goodness matters, and chapter 6 in particular might be regarded 
as its main feature; it describes the Good Company Index (a 
trademark of McBassi and Company, Inc.), an objective system of 
ranking companies as employers, sellers and stewards.  Not only 
does this index identify which organizations are already behaving 
as good companies and which have a long way to go, but the 
intention is to also track progress in the years ahead. Initial work 
has used multiple sources of readily-available information to index 
the 94 publicly traded companies in the US's Fortune 100, and 
there are plans to expand this to a much wider range of companies 
– see the Good Company Index website for up-to-date information. 
   
Part III of the book explains, with striking examples, how 
companies can become good employers (chapter 7); good sellers 
(chapter 8); and good stewards (chapter 9).  Part IV provides an 
outlook – and hope – for the future. 
  
There are extensive notes and references for further reading, and 
the Appendix provides scoring and sources for the Good Company 
Index. 
  
A thoroughly recommended book. 
Good Company: Business Success in the Worthiness Era.  
by Laurie Bassi, Ed Frauenheim, and Dan McMurrer, with Larry Costello 
San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc, 2011 
 
 
This is an optimistic book. It describes how companies can, do, and 
will change for the "better" – as employers, sellers, and stewards – 
and also do better financially while they are about it. While there will 
inevitably be nay-sayers and setbacks along the way, the authors 
put forward the view that the improvements are, in the long term, 
both inevitable and unavoidable for companies if they are to prosper, 
for there are implications for their financial success and indeed their 
very survival if they take no heed. 
  
The book is packed with references in support of its points, while the 
few opposing views or pieces of contrary evidence mentioned are 
countered. Whether the readers are from business,  journalism, 
investment, academia, government, or the general public, they will 
find a wealth of convincing evidence, from reputable sources, that 
companies do well by being good. The sheer number of references 
to research in support of the book's argument build up a convincing 
and 'hopefull' (authors' emphasis) case.  
  
There are four sections, each of two to four chapters, and 11 
chapters in total. Each chapter is followed by a useful summary. 
  
The four chapters making up Part I, 'The Worthiness Era', define 
worthiness and good companies, and why both are becoming more  
important in the current economic, social and political  climates.   
 
 
Anna Lloyd 
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says: Our Director has a long-standing friendship with Laurie Bassi and has nothing but admiration for her work. We felt it was important to draw attention to this new book here, and to wish it well. 
The Publishers 
The third HUMAN CAPITAL HANDBOOK 2011 is part of a continuing series, some free 
and some by subscription, of specialist publications on all aspects of human 
capital measurement. 
 
It is sponsored by HUMAN POTENTIAL ACCOUNTING (HPA), a UK leader in HCM 
analysis and research that helps business leaders and financial analysts assess 
the sophistication and maturity of companies’ human capital or talent management 
strategy and practices.  
 
The series is published on the HPA sponsored interactive library and discussion 
platform, HubCap, where a further 150+ articles by leading academics and business 
leaders can be freely accessed.  It is also available on the dedicated Handbook 
microsite.  
 
Handbooks blend heavyweight articles, some specially commissioned, some 
republished or extracted with permission, together with cartoons, illustrations, 
soundbites and linked snippets designed to enrich the collection, encourage further 
reading, or just have some fun along the way. They deliberately avoid repeating 
received wisdom, preferring to lead and bolster calls for change, debunk prevailing 
assumptions, and shine lights into areas of much needed future enquiry. But they 
are also designed to accelerate the exchange and application of practical HCM 
insights between business and academia: they are Handbooks after all.  
 
If you would like to contribute, please email editor@hubcapdigital.com 
 
 
 
THE PUBLISHERS 
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Comments about previous Handbooks 
SHARE 
email the Handbook link 
ENGAGE 
discuss this ebook on HubCap 
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